PROFESSOR HUSSERL'S PROGRAM OF PHILOSOPHIC REFORM.¹

There is something inspiring, something which commands admiration and arouses hope in Professor Husserl's proclamation of a reform in philosophy. That at least is one's first impression. He would make philosophy scientific. He admits that the attempt has been made repeatedly before, notably by Descartes and Kant. He admits that previous attempts have fallen short of success. But he holds that they made progress in the right direction, and that the time is now ripe for the step which shall make philosophy once for all scientific.²

In this paper I shall undertake to expound some of Professor Husserl's main ideas toward a scientific reform of philosophy. In so doing I shall try to avoid his private terminology as far as possible, and to state his views in the common language of philosophy; I shall restate his thoughts very freely and introduce some illustrations of my own. To this exposition I shall add some paragraphs of comment and criticism with special reference to the relations between Professor Husserl's doctrine and Neo-Realism.

To make room for the scientific philosophy which he seeks, Professor Husserl finds it necessary to show the inadequacy of 'historicism' and 'Weltanschauungsphilosophie' on the one hand, and of empiricism on the other. The former are anti-scientific in method, the latter pseudo-scientific.

By 'historicism' he means the tendency to emphasize the ceaseless transformation of religion, morals, and philosophy, and to conclude that there is no absolute truth to be found in those fields. Dilthey is mentioned as representing this tendency.

¹ In the following notes "P.s.W." refers to the article by Professor Edmund Husserl entitled "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" in Logos, Volume I. "Ideen" refers to the article by the same author entitled "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie," in the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Volume I, edited by him.

² P.s.W., pp. 289-293.
The historicist regards this or that type of philosophy as valuable for the people of a given race and epoch, but this is only a relative validity. The historicist therefore devotes himself to the study of philosophy as a psychological and historical phenomenon performing certain functions in the lives of individuals and societies—like dress or language. Professor Husserl on the contrary contends that the history of opinion can offer no grounds for deciding the question whether a philosophy having absolute objective validity is possible. It can merely show, with infinite circumstance, that opinions have varied—even among the thinkers supposedly most gifted and best trained. But this does not show that no absolute truth will ever be obtained. It does not even show that absolute truth has never in the past been obtained: some one of the numerous doctrines, extant or obsolete, may be the correct one.¹ The sceptical aspect of historicism is therefore ill-founded and must not be allowed to prejudice an attempt to make philosophy scientific in method and objectively valid in results.

Professor Husserl regards the 'Weltanschauungsphilosophie' as an offspring of historicist scepticism. By it he means the tendency to build up a view of the world on the basis of the various special sciences and the manifold experiences of life, without claiming to employ a rigidly scientific method in the process. Such a construction may rightly be recognized as a highly valuable Kultur macht (social and spiritual force). So long as science is silent on issues of the most vital interest, we must trust the 'wisdom' whose vital development produces plausible world-views of profound significance. But such world-views, however profound, are debatable; they struggle among themselves; only science can decide. A world-view must be judged as the achievement of an individual—which he must achieve quickly, so as to live by it. Science, however, is the task of many generations and can afford to wait. A world-view is profound or shallow according to the scope of the experience and insight of its author; science and scientific philosophy are neither profound nor shallow but—evident. Such in his opinion is the value and such the inadequacy of the 'Weltanschauungsphilosophie.'²

The other tendency which must be shown inadequate is empiricism or naturalism. Empiricism and naturalism amount to the same thing in Professor Husserl's opinion, for the empirical method can explore only the spatio-temporal realm called nature, and that realm can be revealed only by the empirical method. Natural scientists are prone to this tendency because the object upon which their attention is concentrated is the world of nature spread out in space and time, and because the method in which they have diligently trained themselves, and which they have applied with marvellous success, is the method of observation and experiment, interpreted by the principles of inductive logic and applied mathematics. When therefore they turn to philosophy they seek to fit all realities into the space-time schema, and to validate all principles by empirical methods.

In particular, the empiricist finds logic and mathematics indispensable to science, and therefore tries to find an empirical basis for them. But this endeavor breaks down the empirical method and fails to establish the needed principles. We hear that mathematics is the product of the whole experience of the race, crystallized in our modes of apprehension; but physics and other natural sciences dare not appeal to any such experience. Again we hear that mathematics is validated by experiments in imagination; but no one would dare appeal to such experiments in physics.\(^1\) The empirical method is therefore debased by the attempt to extend its application.

Moreover, the principles of logic and mathematics have that universality and necessity which Kant emphasized, while the results reached by empirical methods are at best approximate and probable, however close the approximation and however high the probability. It is therefore futile to seek an empirical basis for logic and mathematics.\(^2\)

Empiricism likewise reduces consciousness to a natural phenomenon. It makes little difference whether it adopts materialism, or treats consciousness as an epiphenomenon, or whether, as in the case of Mach, both physical and mental facts are regarded as complexes of 'sensations.' In any case consciousness

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\(^2\) P. s. w., p. 298.
is regarded as a series of phenomena, each item of which is dated in objective time and conditioned by a physical body; it is thus incorporated in the general spatio-temporal realm of nature, and subjected solely and completely to natural laws. On this basis the principles of logic, mathematics, and the value-sciences can appear only as ‘laws of thought’ in the sense of psychological generalizations describing the actual course of the stream of consciousness, mere ‘Spielregeln des Bewusstseins.’ But if consciousness is only one natural phenomenon among others, how can the rules of its own private game reveal to it the surrounding world? Questions as to the validity of logic, mathematics, and the empirical method affect natural science as a whole, for those disciplines are presupposed by natural science; therefore such questions cannot be solved within the frame of natural science by natural-scientific methods. Consciousness must therefore be admitted to be something more than a natural phenomenon, since it grasps principles which transcend the realm of nature and the methods of natural science. Unless that is the case we cannot even have natural science, for it presupposes logic and mathematics.¹ On these grounds also empirical naturalism is adjudged an inadequate philosophy.

Empiricism is a wholesome tendency in so far as it demands that all theory should rest upon direct ‘seeing’ of realities, rather than upon tradition and prejudice. But it is arbitrary and dogmatic in its assumption that all ‘seeing’ must be of the empirical type, namely the perception of individual facts localized in space and time. Logic and mathematics rest in fact upon quite a different kind of ‘seeing.’²

Empiricism bars the way to some necessary advances in science. No empirical science can develop rapidly and securely until its proper basis of non-empirical principles has been found. Thus the physical sciences were stagnant for a long time before Galileo and Descartes gave them a great impulse by providing them with the proper mathematical vehicle. In our own day psychological, social, and axiological sciences are in the doldrums for lack of a

² Ideen, section 19.
sound a priori basis. Yet empiricism cries down all attempts to discover that basis.¹

Neither the anti-scientific methods of the Weltanschauung-philosophie nor the pseudo-scientific methods of empiricism can give us the scientific philosophy we need. A truly scientific method, Professor Husserl maintains, will lift us above personal 'standpoints' to a plane of impersonal objectivity. Such a method will attain definitive results which can be formulated in textbooks and learned. Every science, to be sure, has controversial questions on its borders, but it is the mark of a science to possess at least a nucleus of definitive results, which command the assent of all competent persons trained in the science. When Kant said that we can learn philosophizing but not philosophy, he betrayed the unscientific character of philosophy. For a science can be learned—not passively, to be sure, but by re-thinking its conclusions in logical order.

The true method of philosophizing, which will slowly but surely yield definitive results, is not easy to find—else it would have been found and practiced long ago. It requires a radical modification of our ordinary way of looking at things, a refocusing of our mental vision; this Professor Husserl expresses by saying that we must get a new Einstellung. His name for the needful Einstellung is 'phenomenological,' and the science which it yields is 'phenomenology.' Phenomenology is the fundamental philosophical science, all other philosophical disciplines being dependent upon it for their ultimate clarification and validation.

To lead the reader from his ordinary Einstellung or mental focus to the phenomenological Einstellung is the chief purpose of Professor Husserl's article in the first volume of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. We may set out from our ordinary natural Einstellung. In the natural Einstellung a spatio-temporal world is found. It is a world of inanimate objects, animals, and men, and the thoughts, feelings and wishes of the latter. Not merely the field of actual perception but the adjacent fields are at least vaguely felt as given. This 'horizon' of experience may be explored with

varying success, but never exhausted. The past and future are likewise apprehended as an inexhaustible field for exploration, environing my present experience. It is this natural world with which my intellectual, emotional, and practical activities are chiefly concerned. But I can also turn my attention to arithmetic and a new world stands before me. The world of numbers has no place and no time, and is therefore no part of the natural world. The same applies to kindred abstract sciences. Again I am aware of other selves, who like me can explore the world of nature or the world of numbers, so that they and I live in the same inclusive world.¹

To attain the phenomenological Einstellung two steps or reductions are necessary. The first step is to abstract from our belief in the whole realm of realities just described: physical things, mathematical entities, the plurality of selves. We must focus our attention upon consciousness as such. Not physical things are to be our theme, but perceptions of them, thoughts of them, desires for them; not numbers but the thought of number; not the numerous real selves but the experience in which selfhood is felt or recognized. We are not asked to doubt or deny the reality of these objects; that might be impossible; but we can refrain from using our beliefs about them as premises in our investigation. We need not delete such beliefs, but to attain the phenomenological Einstellung we must 'put them in brackets,' which is Professor Husserl's favorite figure for the process. With our first step, then, we have bracketed the world of objects and fixed our gaze upon a realm consisting solely of consciousness.²

Our second step should cause no difficulty to students either of scholasticism or of Messrs. G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. We are not to describe consciousness as a realm of individual being but to analyze the essences or universals of its modifications. Not this perception-of-a-reading-lamp-with-a-green-shade is the object of our interest, but perception-of-a-physical-thing and color-sensation and awareness-of-use. The universals are not a narrowly limited set, such as Plato and Aristotle seem to

² Ibid., sections 31, 32, 50, 51.
have had in mind, but are as numerous as the nuances of reality. Universalization is therefore always possible without loss, for every bit of individual being has its essence or complete nature. We need only to shift the focus, abstracting from the individuality of the experience, and the essence or universal stands before our mental vision.¹

It is to be noted that phenomenology does not coincide with 'science of universals' in general. Logic, mathematics, and other non-empirical sciences are also sciences of universals, or in Professor Husserl's terminology 'eidetic' sciences. In the phenomenological *Einstellung* these sciences are bracketed just as much as physics and chemistry. Phenomenology is the eidetic science of pure consciousness.²

As an example of phenomenological analysis I propose to state Professor Husserl's view of the way in which physical objects are presented to consciousness. I choose this because it will throw light upon Professor Husserl's relation to realism and idealism. We may, he maintains, rightly say that a given table is square in shape and a uniform brown in color; these are its actual qualities. But in consciousness these qualities are modified according to the position of the observer, the illumination, and other factors. We know the table is square because of the various trapezoidal images we get in viewing it from various directions. We know that it is uniformly brown because it appears darker and duller in the shaded portions. The uniform objective color-quality is represented by a wide variety of color-sensations. These varied appearances Professor Husserl calls *Abschattungen* and he extends the term to the varied appearances of all other physical qualities as well. No quality is to be identified with any of its *Abschattungen*. They belong to different genera: the qualities are essentially spatial; the *Abschattungen*, being phases of consciousness, are non-spatial. The quality is precisely that identical something of which we become aware through experiencing the system of *Abschattungen*. The quality is 'transcendent,' because it can never be an actual component

of consciousness. But it is erroneous to suppose that the quality which transcends our consciousness might be immanent in some other consciousness, say God's. It is in the very nature of such qualities that they can be perceived only in and through a system of Abschattungen.

A full-fledged physical thing is that which has a system of physical qualities varying according to laws. These qualities include both the so-called primary qualities and secondary qualities. That distinction has been modified by modern physics so that only mathematical properties are recognized as primary. But color and so forth are also objective in the sense above described, though they happen not to serve the theoretical purposes of physics. No physical object can be known with absolute certainty, for its various qualities present themselves in a series of Abschattungen that is essentially infinite; the meaning of a series of Abschattungen may be cancelled by subsequent experience, as when an apparently open box turns out to have a glass cover, or the supposed ghost turns out to be a hallucination. It is therefore always technically possible to doubt the existence of a physical object, since the evidence for it can never be all in. The whole natural world is therefore open to the Cartesian doubt. The analysis therefore shows that physical objects are revealed only through the system of Abschattungen in consciousness, and that that revelation is never complete.

So far Professor Husserl's doctrine seems realistic. Selves, physical things, mathematical and logical entities, seem to be treated as coordinate forms of reality. The assertion of the inalienable transcendence of physical things sounds especially realistic. In his earlier work, the Logische Untersuchungen, the resolute rejection of Neo-Kantian formulations and the general trend of the discussion seemed realistic. But here the argument suddenly takes a Berkeleyan turn; we learn that pure consciousness is the only absolute reality, and that all else, however 'transcendent,' is dependent upon it.

No object, he assures us, is such that consciousness does not concern it. All objects are part of the horizon of consciousness.

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If not experienced, they are at least *experienceable*. No mere logical possibility of their being experienced is meant, but a possibility evidenced by the actual experience of objects bound up with the objects in question. Nature depends on consciousness, not consciousness on nature.

The whole realm of nature might be annihilated without annihilating pure consciousness. That is, the course of experience might cease to cohere in such a way as to reveal persistent spatial objects, a plurality of selves, and so forth; in that case the assertion of a natural world would fall to the ground. Pure consciousness would remain, although modified by the disintegration of those coherent sequences of perception which constitute our-experience-of-the-world-of-nature. Pure consciousness is therefore independent of the natural world and cannot be conditioned by it. Pure consciousness has no spatio-temporal environment and enters into no causal relations.

On the other hand, the whole realm of nature, with its physical objects deployed in space and time and subject to causal laws, is dependent on pure consciousness, for it exists only as that which consciousness posits on the basis of its coherent experiences; beyond that it is nothing.\(^1\) Even the plurality of selves is similarly dependent. The states-of-consciousness of this or that self are facts correlated with the processes of a particular living body. A state-of-consciousness proclaims its existence not only through the introspection of the moment, but through the behavior of the organism, through memory, and so forth. Like a physical thing, it is posited on the basis of manifold experiences, and correlation with the organism is indispensable to this process. Without the experiences which lead to the recognition of a plurality of organic bodies, the pure consciousness would not conceive itself as split up into a plurality of selves. "*Ohne Körper, keine Menschen*" (without bodies, no human selves); but without pure consciousness, no bodies.\(^2\)

In this idealistic train of thought the student of American Neo-Realism will readily recognize the process which Professor

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\(^1\) *Op. cit.*, sections 47, 49, 51.

Perry has stigmatized as the fallacy of initial predication. Nature is posited by consciousness on the basis of coherent series of perceptions; therefore nature exists only in so far as it is thus posited: its being is being-rightfully-posited. The initial aspect of being-posited is taken as definitive and exhaustive. This is the whole argument; whatsoever is more than this is merely solemn asseveration.

The chief merit of Professor Husserl’s work lies in its patient exploitation of the direct scrutiny of the contents of consciousness. Neo-Realism has recognized this as the primary source of knowledge but has treated it rather left-handedly. Mr. Bertrand Russell repeatedly refers to ‘inspection’ but is rather apologetic about it, and uses it only as a springboard for discursive and dialectic leaps. Professor Marvin regards perception in a broad sense as basal but does not extensively explore it.\(^1\) Professor Holt’s bold theory of secondary qualities would collapse if it were not for such data as the introspective continuity of the quality ‘roughness’ with the experience of succession.\(^2\) Yet he is habitually distrustful of introspection. Professor Perry’s theory of the self trusts introspection for the rejection of the self as a simple active entity.\(^3\) But ‘general observation’ and discursive analysis are his preferred methods. Now a philosophy is bound to be top-heavy and instable so long as it neglects its acknowledged foundations.

In this respect Professor Husserl furnishes a needful corrective supplement to Neo-Realism. To take a concrete instance, compare Professor Husserl’s analysis of the ‘transcendence’ of physical objects with Professor Perry’s light-hearted assertion that “Neptune may become my idea.”\(^4\) Professor Husserl may be wrong in holding that Abschattungen can exist only in consciousness and that physical qualities have a unique relation to them of being revealed in them. It may be that physical

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\(^1\) The New Realism, pp. 64 ff.
\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 341 ff.
\(^3\) Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 279 ff.
\(^4\) Ibid., p. 287; in fairness it must be added that Professor Perry also says (ibid., p. 279) that “natural objects do not enter wholly into mind.” How the two statements are to be reconciled does not appear.
qualities are organizations of *Abschattungen* (Mr. Bertrand Russell in *Scientific Method in Philosophy*); or it may be that *Abschattungen* are organizations of neutral entities (Professor Holt in *The New Realism*); it may indeed be that in one of these ways the mental and the physical intersect. But it requires little scrutiny of the data to see that a full-fledged physical object like the planet Neptune cannot bodily invade consciousness; only phases of it can do so; and the full-fledged physical object remains, from the point of view of consciousness, a construction.

The results of Professor Husserl's phenomenological analysis cannot be reproduced in a brief article. They are spread out at large in his *Logische Untersuchungen* and in his three-hundred-page article in the *Jahrbuch* previously mentioned. Their merits and defects can be appreciated only by a thorough study of the texts. Still I think that even on the basis of this brief exposition we may fairly point out certain general defects of his doctrine.

In the first place, Professor Husserl is concerned to vindicate the novelty of his undertaking, to establish an absolute distinction between phenomenology and any extant science. In particular he is concerned to distinguish it from psychology, for he once identified it with 'descriptive psychology' and has been regretting this ever since.¹ (If it were allowed to be part of psychology we should have to admit the competence of psychologists to speak upon it. Professor Husserl is perfectly sure, however, that he has discovered a science upon which only he and his pupils are competent to speak.) But it should be noticed that the process by which the phenomenological *Einstellung* is reached is one of 'reduction,' in Professor Husserl's terminology. It is no captious verbalism to say that the process is one of *reduction* in all literalness, and to add that reductions cannot bring us to anything absolutely novel. The more carefully the process is studied the more evident it becomes that phenomenology is reached by *abstracting from, leaving out of sight, neglecting*, if you will, various features of the world which we ordinarily take account of. Now to be sure there is a certain economy of attention in leaving some facts out of account, so as to concentrate upon

¹ *P.s.W.*, p. 318.
others; it facilitates a more thorough analysis of the facts selected. But the part can contain nothing which the whole does not contain, and a selective study can therefore reveal nothing which a sufficiently searching study of the whole field would not reveal.

To come now more definitely to the relation between psychology and phenomenology. Psychology, Professor Husserl maintains, deals with consciousness as the states of mind of various persons who are scattered about in nature and dependent on it. In every psychological judgment the whole natural world is presupposed.¹ Phenomenology, on the other hand, 'brackets' the whole natural world including the plurality of selves, and considers consciousness-as-such. Now what does this mean except that phenomenology neglects the physical and physiological conditions of consciousness, and that it neglects the distribution of consciousness among various conscious persons? And does not every psychologist do the same when he discusses the color-pyramid or the subjective distinctions between image and percept? What absolute novelty can be reached by abstracting from the conditions and distribution of consciousness? Evidently none.

The second reduction, by which we confine ourselves to an 'eidetic' study of pure consciousness, is likewise incapable of securing absolute novelty. By that reduction we no longer consider consciousness as a realm of individual being, a stream of concrete thoughts and feelings, but fix our attention upon the universal types of experience exemplified in it—upon 'thing-perception' in general, 'feeling of disgust' in general, and so on. Now whatever the relation of universals and particulars may be, I think the reader will admit that we are entirely dependent on particulars for our cognition of universals. A simple (i. e., not yet analyzed and perhaps unanalyzable) universal can be known by way of acquaintance only if we are acquainted with an example of it. For instance, clarinet-quality of tone can be known by acquaintance only if we have heard individual clarinet-tones. We might indeed 'describe' it to one who had never heard a clarinet as 'similar to the tone of a flute but more like the human

voice than a flute is'; but that would surely introduce nothing absolutely novel into his experience; he would know certain relations of the entity in question, and might be able to identify a clarinet when he should hear it; but until he heard it he would still be curious as to what the exact clarinet-quality might be. A complex universal may be readily conceived if we are acquainted with examples of its components and of the requisite mode of organization. Thus one can readily conceive 'candle burning at both ends' without ever having seen such a phenomenon; yet one could not conceive it without experience of combustion, duality, ends, etc. Thus acquaintance with universals, whether simple or complex, presupposes acquaintance with examples of all that they contain. The transition to an eidetic study is therefore unable to introduce us to absolute novelties. It neglects the datings, repetitions, and so forth which characterize a field of individual reality. It concentrates our attention upon the similarities and dissimilarities of the various phases of reality, and upon their intrinsic natures. But those similarities, dissimilarities, and intrinsic natures are present in the system of particulars, and would be noted in an exhaustive description of it.

We may conclude then that neither the reduction to pure consciousness nor the reduction to eidetic analysis offers to phenomenology any object outside the scope of an exhaustive psychology. The only novelty it can claim is that of emphasizing a somewhat neglected aspect of psychology. That being the case, the results of psychology cannot be dismissed as irrelevant; nor can psychologists be denied a hearing on the ground that the matter falls outside their sphere.

Professor Husserl's reductions bring a gain through the concentration of attention upon the selected aspects of experience. But they also involve a loss which he does not seem to realize. He feels that phenomenology has nothing to gain by experimental technique. Such technique, he thinks, has value only for determining which persons have such and such experiences and under what conditions. But in fact experimental technique facilitates introspection and helps us to concentrate upon the

intrinsic natures and similarities of phases of consciousness. It
does this by removing distractions, and by presenting crucial
instances. Such a crucial instance is the transition from 'succ-
cession' to 'roughness' which Professor Holt exploits in The
New Realism; such an analysis can be made only under experi-
mental conditions.

Another loss entailed by the phenomenological method is the
loss of guidance from biological and physical principles. Could
the James-Lange theory of the emotions have arisen without
the guidance of physiology, or Professor McDougall's theory of
emotions without the influence of general biology? Yet these
theories have surely facilitated the introspective analysis of the
emotions. To take an extremely controversial case, Professor
Holt's theory of secondary qualities could not have arisen without
the aid of physiology and physics. The bare possibility of its
being true shows the need of reckoning with the conditions of
consciousness even in our attempts at pure analysis.

The defects just mentioned could be more readily forgiven if
we were convinced that Professor Husserl's analyses were free
from verbalism, and based solely on a direct scrutiny of the facts.
But often his method seems more verbal than genuinely intro-
spective. Such a criticism cannot be validated by quotations
torn from their context: some other critic might find that in the
setting of the whole chapter the introspective meaning was clear,
and that my cry of verbalism betrayed my lack of introspective
power. I can only challenge such a critic to stretch his intuition
to the demands of Professor Husserl's language if he can. There
is a passage,¹ for instance, in which we are requested to imagine
a process of abstract thought which flows freely and fruitfully,
so as to arouse joy in the thinker. We are to view this in phe-
nomenological reduction. We are to suppose further that during
the joyous course of thought the thinker casts a reflective glance
upon his joy, thus impeding the course of thought and making
it less enjoyable. By the intuitive scrutiny of this example
we are expected to verify the distinction between joy which is
merely experienced and joy which is also noted or reflected upon.

¹ Ideen, p. 146.
The passage has still further nuances which I omit. Now it is characteristic of the words of a genius for introspection, such as James, that they cast an illumination into our hearts and we say, "So it is, though I never realized it before." The present writer receives no such illumination from the words of Professor Husserl in this and many other passages, and is forced to the conclusion that intuition is here eked out with verbal dialectic.

Professor Husserl's claim to have set philosophy upon the secure path of science seems to me not to have been made good. It is characteristic of science to take account of all facts relevant to its problems; I have indicated that phenomenology by its 'reductions' eliminates indispensable guiding-ideas derived from other sciences. It is characteristic of science to follow a consistent method; I have given my reasons for holding that in Professor Husserl's phenomenology, direct scrutiny is contaminated by discursive and verbalistic constructions. It is characteristic of science to clarify and simplify the problems with which it deals; Professor Husserl's writings are notoriously abstruse and intricate. It is characteristic of science to secure an ever widening circle of unsolicited converts (for where freedom of opinion reigns, anti-scientific forces always decline in influence, and any genuine science has a healthy growth); but Professor Husserl's doctrine has spread no more rapidly or spontaneously than many rival standpoints. I therefore conclude that Professor Husserl has not lifted philosophy from the plane of conflicting standpoints to the plane of objective science; he has merely added one more standpoint to the number.

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