GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN 1913.

As in previous annual summaries, there can be no question here of uniting under a single rigid formula the manifold and somewhat contradictory philosophic movements of the year that has passed. It may be possible, however, to point out some definite centers about which the intellectual process has shown a tendency to concentrate and so attain at least a temporary equilibrium.

The movement back to Kant and to the transcendental formulation of the problems has given its characteristic direction to the trend of recent German philosophy. The positivistic and psychologistic tendencies, and equally the diversified attempts at constructive metaphysics, have been so completely relegated to the background by the new Logismus that at present practically all discussions are carried on in the field marked out by the latter. A notable revival of metaphysical tendencies, it is true, is characteristic of the immediate present; but in this we see on the one hand effects of foreign influences such as that of Bergson, and on the other it must be noted that the significant discussions have by no means departed from the common ground of the critical philosophy. Moreover, while we must admit that the movement in Germany which seeks to erect the vitalistic concept into a universal principle of explanation has largely followed the leadership of Henri Bergson, it must be borne in mind on the other hand that the antilogical implications of the intuitionistic doctrine are recognized as repugnant to German thought. If the life-concept is to effect the synthesis of value and reality, it cannot be alogical or antilogical but the rational principle must rather be reconciled in it with that of intuition.

This is the more to be emphasized since recent investigations have given the logical element the predominance in the whole field of being. Formerly, attention was principally directed to the outer world, whose transcendental interpretation seemed to

1 Translated by F. H. Knight.
be the principal task of philosophy. This was clearly indicated in Kant himself, even though his doctrine of the categories laid down the conditions of all possible experience, and hence applied equally to subject and object. In the more detailed development of his thought, however, and in particular in the formulation of the juridical basis of the categories, his center of interest shifted notably in the direction of objective experience. This is readily to be explained by his pre-eminent interest in the problems of natural science, which for him so completely occupied the foreground of philosophy that they completely dominated his formulation and solution of problems. The critical philosophy is in short an objective view of the world. In this respect Kant inherited and at the same time completed the rationalistic mode of thought which since the Renaissance had expended most of its energy on the epistemological and metaphysical structure of the object. We see why psychology played a relatively minor rôle in the critical system. For Kant psychology, into which quantitative methods and mathematics had not yet been introduced, was not to be called a science at all in the strict sense of the word. Yet he advanced this branch of study enormously, by finding in it the conditions for the realization of the categories. In more recent philosophy also, the 'back to Kant' movement has meant a limitation of the field of psychology. Transcendentalism had first to be established as a method, by overcoming the 'psychologism' of the strong positivistic schools which reduced logical values in the field of natural law to a plane of relativism and deprived them of their character of necessity.

Psychic structure as well as outer nature was treated as a complex of facts whose relations could only be determined by experience and not as possessing timeless and unconditioned validity. The proof, to be sure, that here lurked a crude petitio principii was not hard to give. As the point of departure was the assumption of fixed laws governing the structure of psychic life, the validity of the highest axioms of logic was also assumed, which was the point to be proved by these laws of psychic structure. It is not to be denied that psychology itself suffered sympathetically through this overthrow of 'psychologism'; but
thinkers could not permanently continue in the error that the failure of the unjustifiable attempt to base logic on psychology was any argument against the value of that discipline as an independent science parallel to the other sciences. Furthermore, it was not to be disputed that the perception of the absolute independence of logical values is a psychic fact and must constitute a sphere of the inner experience of reality. Thus it is not strange that Husserl, who published in the first volume of his Logische Untersuchungen the most complete and comprehensive polemic against 'psychologism' which has yet appeared, should devote the second volume of the same work exclusively to phenomenological analyses of the relations of thought to the logical values. The work of representatives of the 'Gegenstandstheorie,' such as Meinong, tends in the same direction; this author's investigation of objectivity in the intellectual and emotional behavior of man fulfills the strictest requirements of descriptive and analytical psychology. Leonard Nelson also, the founder of the Neo-Friesian School, regards the anthropological justification of the categories as the most important if not the only problem in connection with a theory of pure knowledge. The point of his criticism is turned against any attempt at a logical deduction of the forms of the categories, such as has been undertaken especially by the Marburg School. Efforts in this field have recently been directed also toward the placing of psychology on a new basis and starting it out frankly in a new direction; the aim is to derive from the spiritual values, intellectual, ethical and aesthetic, the psychic functions which have objectified themselves in the products of mind in these fields. Thus psychology stands at the parting of the ways; the situation can perhaps not be better characterized than by saying that in place of the old slogan, 'for logic and against psychologism,' the new one must be worded, 'for psychology against psychologism.'

It will be clear from the foregoing that at the present time interest centers in the establishment of psychology on a philosophical foundation rather than in the determination and arrangement of specific psychological facts. Even this general point of view is to be heralded as an evidence of progress.
psychology has been made an empirical science, isolated from the great world problem, and has occupied itself with the collection and inductive treatment of factual data, it has perhaps brought valuable material to light, but has never been able to construct a living coherent system. Its claim to independence from philosophical assumptions, moreover, was at best a somewhat shadowy illusion. It was in fact merely a particular sort of philosophizing, namely, positivistic empiricism, upon which the empirical 'psychology without a soul' so popular in the past decade was dependent. From that philosophy it borrowed its characteristic method, the naïve conviction of the immediately-given nature of experience and of the possibility of getting hold of it through merely reaching out after it, or more correctly, through passive reception of it. Moreover, it was deemed necessary to concern one's self only with the elementary constituents and their appropriate connections, which shows again the influence of the naturalistic conceptions that built up all physical reality out of the ultimate elements—atoms and motion. This parallel manifests itself especially in the associationistic character of the empirical psychology. The thinking spirit, conscious of itself, is merely the final result of the associations, not the motive power of the whole conscious process. We shall see that right here in the relation between feeling and thought, a decisive change sets in with the recent critical psychology. This is accounted for, again, by its place in the general philosophic system to which it belongs. This general view, that is to say, has made it clear that psychical reality belongs to quite a different dimensional form from temporal, that, namely, of logical meaning reaction, into which every incident of experience, even the most simple and rudimentary, is taken up. The associationistic psychology was disposed to limit this function to the most highly organized psychic manifestations, articulate speech and thought, and to link it with representation as a sort of an attachment to prevent its being altogether isolated. A consequence of the overthrow of empiricism by transcendentalism has been that in the analysis of the inner processes these have been recognized as permeated through and through with logical values and
meanings. In the operation a new ground of distinction between the physical and the psychical has become manifest. Not merely the linear character of consciousness, the temporal succession of its content, distinguishes it from the space-time relations and arrangement by position of the outer world, but also the remarkable direction of that content toward an ideal system in no way to be determined in space and time. We think of the physical as constituted by what in form and content it is; the psychical, on the other hand, as well by what it means. That is, the psychical always implies and includes something besides itself, of which it is in the broadest sense symbolic or representative and toward which it is "intentionally" (Husserl) directed. The nature of perception, memory, and the formation of images (Vorstellen), as well as conceptual thought, prove this. It may be objected that this distinction is eliminated by the fundamental critical view of all being, inner as well as outer, as subject to logical law. But this amenability to logical law is not the present question (which itself relates to a strict logical relation); the point now to be emphasized is that in the psychical, a connection with logical values must be realized in an active experience.

It is the merit of Hönigswald to have laid the greatest emphasis on this point in his lecture, Prinzipien der Denkpsychologie, (Berlin, Reuther & Reichard, pp. 45). The central idea of the lecture is the emphasis on the intellectual nature of the mental life and the essential inseparability of thought from all other psychic functions, since they all contain or presuppose it. Only with thought as a point of departure therefore, as Hönigswald clearly shows, can a valid and adequate psychology be built up. "Thus the factor of meaning (Sinn) cuts deeper and deeper into the enormous complexity of the psychic life, as the dominating reaction; and the circumstance which seems to me to demand the most serious consideration, even from a purely psychological point of view, is the tendency of everything psychical in the direction of meaning, or what I should like to call simply the 'meaning' of the psychical. Perhaps we may express the thought in another way by saying that only the relatively meaningless can have a place in the psychic structure; and the striving after
a meaningful connection for elements in an unmeaning juxtaposition probably ceases only with the end of the psychic life itself." In the further development of his thesis Hönigswald provisionally distinguishes, in common with the group of thinkers basing their work on Kant, between epistemology, phenomenology, and the psychology of experience. Epistemology deals with the kingdom of truth and its determining conditions; phenomenology analyzes or dissects the experience of meaning; and psychology investigates the mental conditions which control that experience. Phenomenology omits from consideration the criteria of evaluation of its objects, the distinction between mere meaning and truth. These are furnished only by epistemology; the former science can deal with them merely as experienced, not as judged or appreciated (normiert).

We find kindred lines of thought developed by Driesch in his book on Logik als Aufgabe (Tübingen, Mohr, pp. vi, 99). He also attempts to discover the connection between logic and phenomenology. The latter corresponds to what Driesch calls the science of self-consciousness, while the basis of logic he designates as the science of order. The most important thesis of the work is that the psychic phenomenon of reflection is constructed and not passively experienced, i.e., that it belongs to the realm of order or logic, or that the content of such a mode of consciousness consists in having thoughts. The same is supposed to apply to willing and to any sort of change or becoming. The last is regarded as 'meant objectivity,' while immediate experience would comprehend only the existent which is out of relation to time. I do not believe this thesis will be accepted in its radical form. Even if we do not go so far as Bergson and find in the experience of time the metaphysical intuition of the absolute, we at least cannot deny this experience its character of immediacy. It is quite incomprehensible how a temporal order can be made out of timeless elements by any conceptual process. On the contrary, the assumption of the timelessness of experiences is itself the result of conceptual falsification. It seems to me that with respect to the problem of the past, neither the symbol-theory nor that of its immediately-given character is adequate,
and that a rigid separation of the two is here carried ad absurdum. That we have an immediate experience of the past is simply a contradiction in terms, while it is equally impossible that an order like the temporal could originate from pure existence values through any constructive action. The construction must have some basis of procedure if its result is to possess value as knowledge and not be merely arbitrary assumption. If we ask how a process of becoming can be built up out of existences, Driesch answers, on the basis of memory-symbols. But it will not do to isolate experience and symbol to the degree that they become mutually exclusive opposites. This is possible with artificial, merely conventional symbols like those of speech and writing, but not with those which are forced upon us by the nature of things and to which an objective or theoretical value is to attach. These would be unmeaning either as represented or representing, if they had no substantial connection with experience. Briefly stated, if the past and the consciousness of change rooted in it were merely a static symbol, it would be inexplicable how any transition from it to the dynamics of psychic life could be effected. The problem of time is chiefly interesting because of the very fact that in it, as in the more ultimate problem of the Ego, symbolism and memory recognition (Erlebtheit), or symbol and reality, come so close together that an essential separation is felt to be no longer possible and we rather come in contact with an ultimate reconciling principle of thought and being. Without involving ourselves in a lengthy discussion of this question, we may treat as demonstrated the fact that the distinction, going back to Kant, between empirical and pure time, that given in experience and that logically constructed, remains unshakable. Less assailable seems Driesch's contention that there is in the psychic process only the having of thoughts and no reflection. He may be correct in his claim, based on the results of many experimenters, that in the effort to master a logical situation, the thinkable elements of the problem are predominant rather than the thought-processes themselves. Otherwise expressed, thoughts and not thought, are present to consciousness, and further objective experiences may well be at the basis of these thoughts,
without a fixed determinable relation subsisting between them. It is noteworthy that Driesch himself arrives at the result that no experience is free from the thought element, that there is no such thing as pure feeling, perception or representation.

The book of Fritz Münch on Erlebnis und Geltung (Berlin, Reuter & Reichard, pp. 188) which has appeared as a supplementary volume in the Kantstudien, is based strictly on Kant and Neo-Kantianism. It is a fertile and thorough investigation, along the general line of thought whose main points have been brought out by Rickert, Lask, Christiansen, and the representatives of the Marburg School. The work affords another example of the astonishing degree of differentiation which the logical field has attained in recent German philosophy. The concepts of validity, value, meaning, norm, truth, correctness, and certainty, of the idea and of the category, which were originally almost inseparably commingled in opposition to the intuitive content of experience, are here sharply distinguished and the boundaries which separate them marked out with great subtlety. The transcendental standpoint is rigidly maintained not merely against the empirical but against the metaphysical view as well. All being is founded on import (Gelten); that is the farthest point to which the analysis of thought can be carried. The critical formulation of the problem goes back, not to the old opposition of subject and object, but to that of form and content. Pure, unformed experience is a limiting concept; this does not mean that it is alogical, unmeaning, but merely that it is to be logically derived and defined. On this point we find all the thinkers so far named in agreement. It goes without saying that Münch is led by this conviction to an unconditional repudiation of intuitionism and of all mere experience philosophy. And it is undoubtedly quite true that a pure, unmeaning, non-conceptual experience is an impossibility. The appeal to such an experience which has been made by Bergson and his school, means not merely the end of all philosophy but a purely imaginary furthering of its aims. From the determination of the form of all experience by values, meanings and imports, it by no means follows, however, that any specific relation subsists between the two. In particular,
it does not militate against the original character of metaphysical being. That it is only expressible in propositions implying import does not mean that its import-content exhausts it without a residue. It does not devolve upon us here to enter the lists in favor of a positive metaphysic, but it is fitting that its essential possibility be upheld and the fallacies of any transcendental argument against it disclosed. 'Logism' raises against any metaphysic the reproach of dogmatism, for at the basis of any system, it is alleged, must lie an unscrutinized 'being,' from which in some inexplicable way, the knowing process is derived, while conversely, the being must first be somehow logically constituted. Thus, for example, it would be an illicit procedure to start out from the distinction between physical and psychical and investigate the relation between the two, or to explain the nature of knowledge from this relation. Those objects which are designated as physical and psychical must first be conceptually justified. But we may immediately grant all this without therefore drawing the conclusions of radical 'logism.' For it is itself a dogmatic prejudice that metaphysics unconditionally derives knowledge from a naively hypostatized 'being' and in the form of a subjective copy of the latter. The latest polemic directed against logical idealism (that of Külpe) has shown that the metaphysical concept-building can be critically established as a function of realization. Thus it infers determinate necessities of existence from necessities of thought, proceeding thus from thoughts to being and not in the reverse direction. It proposes to explain, not the realistically and ontologically insoluble problem of thought and consciousness, but that of 'being.' But another problem of metaphysics must be mentioned, which 'logism' does not at first sight appear to meet. This is furnished by the intuitive if not alogical and irrational cognition of 'being' in the act of experience itself. The priority and autonomy of the logical as the basis of knowledge is again not invalidated by the fact that it assures us of something existent. It is at best but a one-sided and unjustifiable view which looks at metaphysics in the light of the mirror-theory definitely overthrown by Descartes himself. The analysis and orientation of
the problem of knowledge which Münch has carried out, and which is so excellent in many respects, must not be given up even if his anti-metaphysical attitude has to be rejected. The point in dispute relates not to the structure of the logical, but to the question whether the logical is able to take 'being' up into itself. Münch's treatment is the less a refutation of the metaphysical in that it also assumes the given character of the content and the determination of the logical categories by the nature of that content, and hence cannot endorse the radical 'logism' based on Hegel.

Among the most important philosophical events of the past year must be named the appearance of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung by Husserl, in collaboration with Geiger, Pfänder, Scheler and Reinach. (Verlag Niemeyer, Halle a/S pp. 847.) The program of this phenomenology had been previously sketched by Husserl in the second volume of his Logische Untersuchungen, as well as in his paper on Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft. The treatment relates, not to the development of a special discipline, but to the laying of a broad foundation to serve as a basis for both philosophy and the special sciences. Husserl draws a sharp distinction between phenomenology and psychology. Psychology is an empirical science, a science of facts and realities; the phenomena of which it treats in common with the subjects to which they appertain belong to the space-time world. Phenomenology, on the contrary, must be built up, not as a science of facts but of essences, as an eidetische science. For the general distinction of the two, it suffices that the essence-sciences are independent of facts-sciences but not conversely: "for it is evident in case of the former that an empirical science, wherever it completes mediate bases of judgments, must be governed by the formal principles laid down by formal logic. In any case, it must, like every science directed toward objects, be bound by the laws pertaining to objectivity in general. To this it must be added that every fact includes an essential material content, and every formal truth belonging to the pure essence so included must furnish a law binding upon every given, and indeed upon every possible,
factual detail." For pure phenomenology, Husserl demands that the science hold aloof from the natural or realistic standpoint, and deal strictly with the pure or transcendental consciousness which must be the exclusive object of contemplation. This view of consciousness abstracts it entirely from every question as to the existence of the thing known, and occupies itself, as we may otherwise express it, not with the 'whether' but with the 'how' of being. This is the first distinctive mark. The second is found in the fact that this exclusive occupation with the essential connections of experience does not mean abstraction, but merely the adoption of an immediate, intuitive, phenomenological point of view. The concept of intuition is used by Husserl in a sense much wider than the current one, extending far beyond the sphere of perception and including all given aspects of relation of which we are immediately aware. This extension of the meaning of intuition is undeniably a forward step, as in consequence of it the problem of evidence is rightly placed on a basis of intuitive procedure instead of determinate logical feelings. A completely clear distinction, to be sure, is not given between this field and that of pure thought; such a distinction would be of the greatest importance, however, as it would finally succeed in placing in a new light the problem of intellectual intuition, which Kant regarded as the fundamental problem of metaphysics. This phenomenology is not entirely lacking in metaphysical tendencies, even though it seeks to limit itself to an immanent analysis of the data of consciousness. The character assumed by the problem of the outer world should be especially mentioned. There is a definite rejection of the theory, shared by empiristic and rationalistic systems, according to which that which is given in perception is an image or symbol of the real metaphysical attributes of things. Such a conception always implies that the actual object and that which stands for, or symbolically represents it are distinct, while Husserl emphatically insists that the physical thing and the thing perceived are one and the same. The physical thing is merely the perceived phenomenon logically determined. Thus thought does not leap over into a transcendent sphere, but follows to the last attainable step the course which
lay open from the sphere of perception. It now becomes clear that Husserl's methodological attitude toward the problem of 'being' is entirely similar to that of Neo-Kantianism, and for that reason, too, he shares in all the difficulties which the latter standpoint encounters. This relates especially to the concept of 'pure consciousness,' as it is not clear how such a concept, as a strictly logical structure, can solve the fundamental problem of reality. The assertion of the necessary identity between the thing perceived and the physical object can by no means be regarded as overcoming the difficulties of the position. As an illustration, we need only ask how unification is to be thought between such heterogeneous complexes as colors and tones on the one hand and atoms on the other. As far as the plan of the phenomenology has been developed up to the present, it seems that with all the minuteness of analysis and delicacy of shading in which Husserl shows himself a master, there is still wanting a clear and definite separation and demarcation of two possible views which we may designate in a general way as the subjective and the objective. The descriptive, phenomenological analysis of essence-structures must still be distinguished from an adequate treatment of values in the sense of a closed system of knowledge. In a word, the boundaries between psychology and logic are not yet drawn sharply enough, in spite of all the refutations of psychologism. Hence we find some justification for the objections of the logicians against the exclusive domination of phenomenology brought about by Husserl's work and also by the important contributions of his collaborators. Among the latter, Scheler's *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* is worthy of especial mention.

Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* has many points of contact with Husserl's phenomenology, and both authors recognize this relation. They do not fully coincide, however, and this applies not merely to divergences in individual results, but to more fundamental differences in their methodological bases; with the 'objectivity theory' seems to lie the advantage of a sharper drawing of the lines. A programmatic outline of the theory is to be found in Husserl's observation that the old ontological theory
that the knowledge of possibilities must precede that of realities is, rightly interpreted and applied, a profound truth. The historic connection of this view with the classically based Wolffian ontology has been appropriately emphasized by recent writers, especially by Pichler. The essential point here is again the separation of the 'how' from the 'whether' of being, or, as we may also express it, of essence from existence. The essence relations are to be discovered independently of the question of realization. The position of the Gegenstandstheorie is accordingly dissociated from the problem of existence and leaves factual reality out of consideration. Its procedure is, however, distinctively one of objectification and not of psychologizing, as it is concerned with the actual structure of knowledge values. It is differentiated from Kantian apriorism by two characteristics, though, more strictly regarded, the two may spring from a common root. The categories of the critical philosophy are also ideal, that is to say, independent of existence; they are derived from no experience, yet they are immediately related to experience in a teleological way and hence form a basis for the problem of being. Probably closely connected with this is the fact of Kant's exclusive, one-sided orientation of the theory of the categories in relation to mathematics and physical science. In opposition to this, Meinong's field of investigation is limited by no such restrictions. He seeks the *a priori* in every region of the given; it is characteristic of his method that he finds the archetype of apriorism in the comparing activity itself. For example, if two colors are under consideration, each of them is a datum of experience, but the discernment of their difference requires for its explanation no especial act of experience. It announces itself in an act of intuitive certainty which is completely independent of that through which the two related experience-contents are recognized. It is obvious that apriorism here penetrates much farther into the sensible than with Kant, who, with the exception of the pure concepts, does not go beyond the forms of intuition. That these investigations cover much psychological territory in spite of their general logical character, follows of necessity from the nature of the problems treated. In Husserl's *Abhandlungen*
zur Erkenntnistheorie und Gegenstandstheorie (Leipsic, Ambrosius Barth, pp. x, 554), in the second volume of the collected discussions, are included studies on the Theory of Relations, on the Epistemological Evaluation of Memory, on the Significance of Weber's Law, on Higher-Order Objects and Their Relation to Inner Perception, and on the Gegenstandstheorie. In following this series of investigations, the author's intellectual development gives its characteristic stamp more and more to his work, and the transition from the psychological method to that of the 'objectivity theory' is more and more prominent.

Oesterreich's able and suggestive volume on Die Phänomenologie des Ich in ihren Grundproblemen (Leipsic, Barth, pp. vii, 532), falls in the same general field of discussion as the foregoing. As the title itself indicates, the fundamental interest of the work relates to the foundations of psychology. It aims to place the subject in the proper light and bearing by clearing it of the prejudices incident to the carrying over of objective standards into the field of consciousness. As I have previously pointed out in my introductory paragraphs, the extraordinary development of the natural sciences and the turning of philosophical interest toward the problem of nature, led to the intrusion of the objective method into psychology, where it must necessarily come into conflict with its subject matter. The author referred to sees the extreme embodiment of this error in the sensualistic theory according to which the Ego is the sum of the feeling-contents. Condillac, Hume, and recently, Mach, have been historically its most influential representatives. For substantiating it, recourse is often had to the subjectivity of sense impressions. Oesterreich, however, rightly points out the error and equivocation of epistemological and psychological subjectivity. While the sense-content does not exist, as naïve realism assumes, yet it is no more an appurtenance of the Ego; it is also a comparative stranger to the critical realists and the idealists. To the Ego belong the acts of feeling, perceiving, representing, and thinking, which Oesterreich has attempted with apparent success to distinguish from their contents, and, more especially, feeling and willing. The identification of the will with the Ego, met with
in many strict voluntarists, is here denied. From this it is clear that with respect to his conception of the Ego, the author adopts the attitude neither of a positivistic phenomenalism nor a metaphysical substantialism.

The book contains, as well, many extended and valuable discussions in the field of logic and the theory of knowledge. The author inclines unmistakably toward critical realism. It is essentially because the Ego is something other than the sum of its sense-contents that it can objectify the latter and conceive them as an outer world independent of itself. But this conceiving must also be always a distinguishing; an immediate awareness of external reality, whether of things or of the consciousness of our fellows, such as intuitionism assumes, is untenable. Herein is contained at the same time a protest against the mystical turns in modern epistemology.

A wholly different standpoint, though one quite in the general direction of the problems we have discussed, is adopted by Natorp's Allgemeine Psychologie, 11. Buch. Objekt und Methode der Psychologie (Tübingen, Mohr, pp. xii, 352). This work must immediately arouse the greatest interest since in it one of the best-known representatives of classical 'logism' expresses himself concerning a field in which the Logos seems to find its limits. In our introduction, it will be recalled, we referred to the fact that the methodology of 'logism' has succeeded in displacing that of 'psychologism.' The question then becomes the more important as to what form psychology is to take when reconstructed in its proper domain. Natorp had already answered preliminary questions in his Einleitung in die Psychologie written some time ago; Cohen also, in the last part of his System der Philosophie, suggested a new treatment of psychology. This is regarded as the final significant result of the critical procedure. The point of departure is not the facts of the mental life but those most objective manifestations, the valuation processes and spiritual activities in which it objectifies itself, the fields of logic, ethics and aesthetics. Psychology is then frankly a process of reconstruction of the mental out of these its factual productions. The empirical can only be conceived in terms of pure thinking,
willing and feeling. Natorp too holds to this general direction. Yet a difference seems to persist between his view and the plan of Cohen's psychology as far as can be judged from the works of the philosopher hitherto published. Cohen derives the psychical immediately from the objective as its presupposition or realization-form. Natorp advocates a reversal of this whole point of view; the function of 'objectification,' he opposes to that of 'subjectification' as a basis of psychology. The crucial point in his thought is revealed in the leading principles of the Marburg school. It consists in the fact that to the dogmatic conception that the subject and object are ultimately given factors which thought always finds already present, is opposed the critical view, according to which subject and object are only constituted by fiat (Setzungen) of thought itself. Logical idealism hopes especially by adopting this course to ward off suspicion of subjective idealism or idealism of mere consciousness. Now the question is supposed to be not so much to construct psychology out of logical materials, as a parallel science 'beside' the others, as to provide a transcendental foundation for it. Then it would be, as Natorp is never tired of emphasizing, a mere science of objects, and not a science of the subject, which is its innermost problem. According to this, the objectifying procedure is inapplicable here, for it would assume that the real object of psychology forms a portion of existence, coordinated with the objects of the other disciplines and forming with them the whole of the existent. But this is not true. The relation of the subjective to the objective is, according to Natorp, not that of one part of a sphere to another part, inside of a whole equally including both. He declares himself an opponent of the theory, which we find permeating the thought of Oesterreich and many other psychologists, that any limited group of phenomena, such as feeling and will, constitute the Ego, or that the latter is to be sought in the activity of mental life, or specifically, in acts as distinguished from contents. He denies any fundamental duality of activity and content; activity is also content, in so far as it is known, and it is as the most general reference point of content that the Ego figures. The process of subjectifying cannot then
consist in the selection and fixing of certain contents or content-groups, but in an attitude which equally includes all, but in a sense radically opposed to that of the method of objectification. “Only in knowledge are subjectivity and objectivity, or rather subjectification and objectification to be distinguished as two different ‘directions of the knowing process.’ Or, we may distinguish the appearance simply as such from its two-fold contemplation: on one hand as an appearance for consciousness, and on the other as an appearance of an object.” Subjectification is supposed to restore the character of the immediately experienced out of the objective product of consciousness. It may appear somewhat surprising that uncompromising logism here arrives at a result akin to that of Bergsonian intuitionism. Natorp combats this position at length, and not merely in a polemic against the French thinker’s negative estimation of the logical; he finds rather an impossibility in the contention that the immediately experienced should be cognized simply in the form in which it is experienced. It can only be disengaged, he thinks, from its conceptual envelope by an infinite process of subjectification corresponding to the infinite process of objectification. That is, it can not be grasped by a mystical suspension of the intellectual function, but only by means of this function, exercised, however, in a reverse direction. It is clear that this procedure stands in the closest relation with Husserl’s Phänomenologie which also, it will be remembered, seeks to get back of the objective character of thought to the problem of the pure consciousness on which it rests. The phenomenological procedure is likewise one of ‘encompassing.’ It strives by drawing more and more narrowly the bounds of objective determination, to fix the attention on the original pure form of the experience. What Driesch calls Ordnungslehre seems also to aim at a similar goal.

Our study of the leading thought currents has substantiated the reference made in the introduction to the central position occupied by the psychological problem. It may be described as a peculiar sort of impressionism, comparable to certain movements in recent art, which thus finds expression in the character
of the mental life. It is most sharply brought out by Natorp: 
the mental life is to be understood through a sort of opposition 
to or struggle against all objectification of value. Two consider-
ations are to be noted in reference to the discussion. In the 
first place we must ask whether the fundamental basis of the 
logistical conception of the nature of reality, which also determines 
its anti-metaphysical attitude, does not become involved in 
uncertainty in Natorp's treatment of psychology. The final 
result of the process of subjectifying reconstruction can only 
signify the reduction of the reality in the object to the pure 
immediacy of experience. In that case there would either be 
two sorts of existence, one founded in import (Gelten) and the 
other in life, or else, if this duality appeared untenable, it would 
become imperative to subject the whole logistical concept of 
reality to a revision to avoid the opposition between it and life. 
From this it would follow in the second place, that the spheres of 
life and of import would stand in a very different relation to 
each other and that their coincidence would be achieved at once 
instead of only at the end of an infinite logical process. Thus 
only could the absolute opposition be overcome between subject 
and object, which is inconsistent with the monism of the trans-
cendental method. In this way we should be given a new meta-
physics, a doctrine of 'being' as an identity of value and reality; 
it would mean the reconciliation of intuitionism and logism which 
has been striven for in Germany. Attempts in this direction 
are by no means wanting in the most recent literature. An 
example is Zschimmer's Welterlebnis (Leipzig, 3 Teile nebst 
Anhang Prolegomena zur Panlogik), a book marking a return to 
Hegelian viewpoints. The 'logic of oppositions' here expanded, 
seeks the synthesis in the concept of life, which accordingly is 
not taken in an alogical sense, but rather as the concrete unity 
of the reality of nature with the ideal spirit. This deeping and 
broadening of the concept represents the only possible form under 
which can be effected the reconciliation of the metaphysical 
vitalism of the 'life' philosophy and the pure logism of the 
'import' philosophy. It corresponds with this fundamental 
broadening of the basic principle that the categories of mood 
(Gemüt) and passion are included in the new system.
Simmel's very intelligent discussion in Logos, "Das individuelle Gesetz," tends toward the same final result, attempting to discover in the concept of individuality an existence-structure logically formed. The further effort is made to isolate in the individual life a sphere which is neither the purely general of the concept nor the purely particular of the irrational unique detail, but both in one. Individuality is hence rigidly distinguished from subjectivity, or more exactly, it is defined as the synthesis of the subjective and objective principles. It is a form amenable to law, yet one in which is included a real, individual, concretely experienced element. Here again the effort is clearly visible to combine organically with Bergson's conception of the mental as purely dynamic, the formal principle of logic. The attempt is promising to say the least; the possibility of a new metaphysic can only be won where the idea is represented as a living entity.

Oscar Ewald.