III.—THE STARTING-POINT OF HUSSERL’S PHILOSOPHY.

By C. V. SALMON.

EDMUND HUSSERL, founder of the German Phenomenological School, regards himself as one who has re-established philosophy’s most ambitious claims. In opposition to the modern tendency to conceive of philosophy as a body of special sciences, Husserl has worked for more than forty years to provide a conception of aim general enough and a practise of method fruitful enough to relate all philosophical research within one motive and secure it upon one foundation. Phenomenology is to comprehend the universum of knowledge in an a priori which both conditions the acquisition of all pieces of knowledge and contains the secret of the meaning of knowledge as such.

Husserl conceives philosophy as a descriptive science of the constituents (phenomena) of pure consciousness. Consciousness is conceived as actually being that of which it becomes conscious when it is deprived of that awareness of objects which is the normal outcome of its activity. Husserl is convinced that we, being understood here not as persons but as bare egos, having been long devoted to the study of these objects with which consciousness has presented us, have remained blind to the fact that consciousness is something in itself the nature of which we can discover. Using an entirely reflexive introspection, under which consciousness becomes aware of itself, the phenomenologist is to describe the phenomena which reveal themselves as the ultimate factors, the conditions sine qua non, of all awareness of objects. Being the elements of consciousness phenomena are, in a specific sense, “experiences” (Erlebnisse),
the usually unconscious enjoyment, or living through, of which constitutes—that is to say, creates—the individual's awareness of himself and other objects. These experiences are “intentional.” As consciousness produces an awareness of objects, so in itself it is a reference to what can only be called “objects” in a modified sense. For that to which consciousness itself refers, that which it intends, is not an entity which is an object of consciousness, it is “already” “in” consciousness. It is the object of consciousness as we are conscious of it. The phenomenal experiences show themselves to consist of “acts” of reference to and “points” referred at, of noesis (νοεῖν) and noema (νοημα), the act of intention and the intention of the act. It is by means of its own intrinsic intentionality that consciousness produces an awareness of objects. Phenomenology has an original solution to contribute to the problem of the relation of subject to object in general.

Awareness of entities which are, in phenomenological language, “transcendent” to consciousness (all those objects are called transcendent of which we can be aware in all but reflexive states of consciousness), are due to the actual references of consciousness itself. The noematic points to which consciousness refers in itself are called “immanent.” These noematic points are what consciousness becomes aware of when its usual attention toward the transcendent entities has been inhibited. In other words, the relation of subject to object actually “takes place,” “occurs,” “happens” within the limits of the purely subjective. The original subject-object relation does not span the antithesis between the subject of consciousness, on the one hand, and the transcendent entities of which he is aware on the other. The subject of the only actual subject-object relation is not any self, for the self is among the entities of which consciousness produces an awareness; and the object of the actual subject-object relation is not any transcendent object,
since this, if it be regarded in and for itself, has no relation to any subject, and, if it be regarded as an object of awareness, presupposes some actual subject-object relation by means of which it was objectified.

Attempts to explain the relations between real experiences such as psychology investigates, and other real entities which are not experiences, do not cover the ground of the philosophical problem. These relations are not relation in the philosophical sense. They are "factual" as opposed to "actual" relations, if I may so express a distinction, which Husserl makes between that which is "real," having its existence either in the spatial-temporal world or in the objective temporal world of psychical reality, and that which is "real," having its existence among phenomena in the subjective sphere. From the subjective standpoint factual relations are "dead" relations and cannot either explain or assume the rôle of "live" relation which is the actual relating to an object by a subject. Other attempts have been made from the materialistic side to solve the problem, no longer in terms of relations between objects, but, by a mysterious passage from an entity to a subject. These attempts have sought to improve their impossible task by confusing "sense-data" with physiological disturbance, as if it was possible for something to be both physical and a state of consciousness at the same time. We can, of course, distinguish between that which is "given" and the "sensation" or sensory experience in which it is given, but the something given presupposes the sensory experience and stands, therefore, already on the subjective side. To be aware of physiological disturbance is one thing and a possible, but to try and pass from physiological disturbance to awareness of it by trying to compound the awareness out of the physiological disturbance is another and an impossible. Sensation is either a state of conscious experience or it is nothing. If it is a state of conscious experience it cannot
be constructed of nerve contractions and what not, but must be constructed within consciousness and consist of intentional experience. Like every awareness sensation refers to an object. It is therefore itself intentional. Either it can be regarded, therefore, as a sensation of a factual entity, of a pain, a heat, something rough, something square and such like, in which case there is an intuitive filling (Erfüllung) to the intentional processes, but the actual relation of subject to object remains still unexplained, or it can be regarded under introspection as a sensation as we are conscious of it, where the relation of subject to object will be explained in terms of the actual relation of noesis to noema. In this explanation both sides of the relation remain within the subjective sphere of consciousness. Awareness of entities, then, is not a relation of the perceiving subject to the entities which he perceives, but the intuitive "filling" and "transcendent" satisfaction of actual relations or references made within the body of consciousness itself. These remarks apply also as a criticism of the ingenious attempt which some writers have made to account for our consciousness of objects in general, and for our perception of the realities of the physical world in particular, by means of "presentations," which they call also "immediate experiences." "Immediate experiences" are to provide the link between the cognitive, attentive and conative subject, on the one hand, and the objects of his full or apperceptive consciousness upon the other. The use of the word "experience" suggests the enjoyment of some such subjective processes as those we have called intentional. But we are expressly told that we are to think of these experiences as objective and not subjective. In the case of perception, where the immediate experiences in question are called "sensations," we are told, for instance, that "they are not immediate experiences which enter into the constitution of . . . subjective states . . . on the contrary, they are immediate experiences
which enter into the constitution of objects apprehended, attended to . . ., etc."* In other words, the distinction between sensum or sense-datum and the act of sensation is expressly denied. It is in this way the general principle is laid down that "presentations . . . condition the apprehension of all other objects . . . directly by their actual existence as immediate experiences. . . ."† The results of this theory are, first, the confinement of the subjective sphere to the three so-called "states" of mind, cognition, attention and affection, and, second, the dilemma of being obliged either to accept the doctrine that what are cognized and attended to are not transcendent objects but immediate experiences, or to tolerate two levels of objectivity, the one apparently "prior" to the other, a doctrine which used to be the bane of representational theories. But, whichever alternative be adopted, the theory is yet guilty of the old mistake of trying to build consciousness out of bricks of objects of consciousness instead of out of consciousness itself. Phenomenology would right the position by subjectifying the "immediate experiences," and restoring the old division of sensation into act of sensing and object sensed. But, being regarded now on the subjective side of consciousness, these would be converted into noesis and noema, and their "immediacy" into the phenomenological "immanency."

This concerning presentationalism! Concerning the other efforts which have been made to account for the subject-object relation altogether "outside" the limits of the subjective sphere, these, as has been shown, are based on the assertion of "dead" relations perceived as existing between one entity and another, and fail by reason of the presupposition they make of the relation which they mean to explain, the actual

relation, namely, of the counterpart of these entities in noesis to noema in the construction of objectively directed consciousness.

It is regrettable that attempts to solve the problem of the subject-object relation undertaken from the idealistic standpoint have, for the most part, ignored the character of consciousness and been content to formulate theories which, if they belong anywhere, belong to ontologies of the objective sphere of abstract ideas. In so far as such theoretical speculations have discovered truth it has been objective truth, gained from an observation of the ideas in question and an examination of their nature. Truths acquired thus, being generalities, are a priori, and the result of abstraction. But, unless they issue from a perfectly "dilute and airy" metaphysic which would be antinomical in Kant's opprobrious sense, they are the result of an enquiry into ideas for whose objectification some experience of consciousness is already responsible. They, therefore, presuppose the relation of subject to object which they pretend to explain. Whenever consciousness is occupied with objects, the results of its occupation, be they particular observations or general laws deduced from or applied to these, must always have reference to some objective sphere. This objective reference is not diminished, as some have held, by degrees of abstractness. No matter how perfectly general may be the final expression of these scientific principles, if they were either abstracted from, or hypothesised to meet, the facta, they refer to that objective sphere to which the facta belong. There is no passage from objective to subjective by process of variation or abstraction. Whence the variation starts, thither must it refer. To have reference to things subjective abstraction and variation must start their operations within the subjective sphere.

It is unfashionable nowadays to speak of "faculties" of consciousness. The old faculty psychology, we know, is dead.
But its death should perhaps liberate the word and allow it to appear once more among the living, bearing a new significance. The word would be convenient to phenomenology. Any intuitive and "original" "vision" capable of presenting a person with an object would be called a faculty. A faculty is thus the type of means through which a person comes to his awareness of the corresponding class of entities transcendent to consciousness. Perception would be called a faculty, perception being the type of means through which we come to our awareness of physical entities in the extended, temporal, world. Imagination would be called a faculty, being the type of means, obviously somewhat similar to the type called perception, through which we come to our awareness of imagined events. Memory would be the type through which we come to our awareness of remembered events, a type again obviously similar both to perception and imagination. The moral-sense would be called a faculty, the means through which we intuite the good. The aesthetic sense would be the means to our intuition of beauties. The rational intuition would be called a faculty; through it we intuite truths. And so on! The list is, of course, not complete.

The first advantage to spring from the use of this notion of faculties will be the equalisation it will necessitate of the claims of the varieties of objects presented to us by these faculties to be considered transcendent to consciousness. Whatever is object to a faculty is an entity—that is, a thing in itself. The nature of some of these entities is to be real (sense of factual), the nature of others is to be ideal. There has long been a prejudice in favour of confusing ideal objects with the experiences in which we are aware of them. Ideas have often been said, loosely, to have no "existence" outside our consciousness. But whatever is an object to consciousness must be taken to be that, as which it is indeed presented, namely, an entity with
an "existence" of its own. Certain "sensations" or "feelings" also have sometimes been treated as if they were indistinguishable from the sensing and feeling of them. But in the phenomenological terminology nothing which is or can be an object to consciousness can be called "immanent." Whatever can become an object to consciousness is an entity, and whatever is an entity is called "transcendent."

Now all entities are capable of being studied in and for themselves. Phenomenology, believing in the ultimate trustworthiness of evidence supplied by consciousness, advises thus: If you want to know what the nature of an entity is, enjoy the faculty through which the entity is presented to you. Use it, live in it as you ordinarily do, only make a more careful use of it than usual. In ordinary life you live in your faculties with your attention on the objects which they present to you. Do not, then, now, change, or suppose that you are changing the bias of your attention. Only take care that you are not living simultaneously in a plurality of faculties, lest you introduce facts from other spheres of objectivity which are not essential to the one sphere of objectivity which you have chosen to observe. Be sure, in particular, that you do not introduce any element of self-consciousness into your observations. (The means by which the Ego apprehends the self is a distinct faculty.)

Having separated the objects of your chosen sphere from those of all the other spheres, having disciplined yourself, that is, to the use of one sole faculty, you must be sure next that in trying to induce from the facts you observe laws proper to them you do not attempt to enforce upon them laws which you, or others, have found to be valid in other objective spheres than the one now in question. Instances of such hypostasis are common. The characteristics of the true, the beautiful, and the good have often been extended to explain the behaviour of objects in other spheres. The very name of metaphysics suggests that this
so-called branch of philosophy will thrive, as it has often done, on the rational hypostasis, the hypostasis, namely, of laws objective to the faculty of the rational intuition into objects presented by other faculties. On the other hand, the temptation to the empirical hypostasis, the application of physical principles, and in particular the application of the causal principle, to non-physical spheres, has often proved irresistible to thinkers approaching philosophy and psychology from the standpoint of natural science.

Mention of these hypostases suggests a comparison of phenomenology with logic, on the one hand, and with psychology on the other. Both the one and the other can provide a means of approach to phenomenological conceptions and phenomenological method.

The claim of philosophy to regard itself as the parent science has often been considered to find its justification in the fact that, since all scientific knowledge is in the last resort reasoned knowledge, the examination of the laws of reason must lead to the formulation of a body of a priori principles which must be recognised as the foundation of all science. Phenomenology, while admitting the formal dependency of all abstract knowledge upon the principles of reason as they can be established by logic, denies that this rational justification of scientific knowledge provides philosophy with its ultimate a priori. It asserts, on the contrary, that the logical a priori is itself in need of a foundation which phenomenological description can provide. It is a fundamental mistake, and one that has already been noticed, to suppose that because any specific body of law is general in its essence it ceases to have reference to the objective sphere whence it started—that is to say, whence it was abstracted. All knowledge is objective knowledge if it has a reference to entities which are objective to consciousness. The general laws of motion, for instance, are true not of the particular movements
of particular bodies, although they condition these, but of moving bodies in general. But, being thus general in their nature and an a priori to all particular movement, it being impossible that any body should move except in conformity to these principles, these principles yet have reference obviously to the objective world of space and time as it is presented through the faculty of perception. Comparing the laws of motion with the principles of the form of reason, these last may be said to "underly" those former. It would not have been possible to formulate the general laws of motion except in conformity to the principles of the form of reason. And, in general, there can be no formulation of any general principles whatever except in conformity to the principles of the form of reason. It is admitted, therefore, that the logical principles of the form of reason stand in the same relation to the mechanical principles of motion, as do the mechanical principles of motion in general to the observed movements of particular bodies. We may speak of a priori bodies of principles as having degree in a-priority. The principles of the form of reason have a greater degree of a-priority than the principles of motion in general. But the principles of the form of reason do not possess the ultimate degree of possible a-priority. To what have the principles of the form of reason reference? They have reference to abstract ideas, and these abstract ideas themselves have reference to the entities from which they have been abstracted. Now there is no particular mystery, such as some have liked to imagine, attaching to abstract ideas. While, speaking psychologically, the mind arrives at them through a process of varying particulars with the attention concentrated to observe identity in difference, yet, speaking with ordinary objective significance, they are entities with a nature of their own. They are presented as objects to consciousness through the faculty of the intuitive reason. If we want to understand their nature we must enjoy,
live through, our faculty and observe the character and "behaviour" of these ideas as they are presented to us. Whereas our objects in the first instance of observing particular moving bodies were real, our objects in the first instance now of observing abstract ideas are ideal. In the case of enquiring into motion we varied these particular movements to observe identity in difference and arrive at the principles of motion as such. In the present case of enquiring into ideas we perform a similar operation. While it is not usual to call general ideas "particular" because they are abstract, we may yet call them "particular" in virtue of their content, and so emphasise the analogy between the two cases of abstraction. In passing from the observation of particular abstract ideas to the formulation of the general principles (the logical principles) of abstract ideas in general, we again vary our objects, keeping our attention upon identity in difference.

The findings of conventional logic have no right to be called subjective. There is, at it were, an arrow of objective reference running right through the relation of abstract to concrete. Even the logical abstract refers back through its own particular sphere, to another abstract, and through this to this abstract's own particular sphere, and so on until it reaches the particular objective sphere of entities beyond which there is no going. The abstract of logic is, as it were, the feathers on the arrow, while the entities of the physical world are its barb.

Now there is a phenomenological rule which says, whenever you are presented with an object you are using a faculty (or, if the object is a compound, a plurality of faculties), and whenever you are using a faculty there is opportunity for a phenomenology. A phenomenology is a description under introspection of a faculty in operation. There can be a phenomenology of every faculty. This phenomenology will explain, in terms of a description of consciousness, the manner in which we become
aware of the entities in question, and therefore, also, the "sense" which these entities have for us in so far as they are objects to us. Now the claim ascribed to philosophy to be the parent science in virtue of its logical enquiries is obviously analogous, in a certain sense, to the claim just advanced for phenomenology.

It should, indeed, have become evident that the essence of the relation of abstract bodies of law to groups of particular entities can be expressed in phenomenological terms. It cannot, I think, be explained in any other terms. For its explanation involves the general problem of the subject-object relation, some of the usual difficulties attending whose solution have already been noticed. The justification of the passage from observed particulars to the formation of general principles applicable to these lies in the fact that there are certain types of structure, revealed to phenomenological introspection, related to one another as modes within the one general system of consciousness. The faculties are related to one another as modes of one system. The abstraction of valid general principles is possible because the particulars have a significance or meaning for us as being the outcome of certain mutually related structure-types. The change of attitude which the scientist makes when he ceases to regard facta and turns to consider the possibilities of facta finds its justification in the ideal relation existing between the particular awareness of the particular entities and the general structure-type to which each of these is bound to conform. All objective general principles have thus a double dependence upon the subjective principles of consciousness. They depend in the first place upon the actual syntheses in consciousness, noesis and noema, by whose means the particulars from which the principles were abstracted were presented to consciousness, and they depend in the second place upon the varieties of these syntheses actually possible within the whole system of consciousness, in virtue of which alone it was possible for the general ideas to be
abstracted from the particulars and presented when abstract as objects to consciousness. All faculties, being types of intentional consciousness, reveal themselves under introspection to possess each its own system of noesis intending noema, in strict accordance with which it must construct itself. Only according to certain processes, certain syntheses of intending acts intending objects in consciousness, can the faculty construct itself and be enjoyed. The general principles of abstract disciplines, with their objective reference, are the counterpart of the phenomenological principles of systematisation which hold of the operation of the faculties in question, just as the particular entities of which we are aware in ordinary life are the counterpart of the actual intention of the actual intuitive faculty which we enjoy. The logical a priori then can only be called the foundation of science in the circumscribed sense that its degree of a-priority is higher than that of the other a priori disciplines. But so far is it from being an absolute a priori requiring no foundation for itself that its position at the head of a scale of disciplines related upward for foundation one upon another, but referring downward each through the other, through the objective sphere of each to the last concrete objective sphere, shows itself not only to need support, but, being defined, points in the direction in which that support may be found.

Enquiry, then, into the nature of logical a priori leads toward the phenomenological starting-point. The relation of entities to abstract disciplines, and of those disciplines to one another, can be stated within the phenomenological conception of meaning. Entities—we must trust to the affirmations of our faculties—have an existence in and for themselves, but they have a meaning for us in so far as they are objects to us, which is in so far as we create for ourselves our awareness of them. The nature and existence which entities have can be studied by our enjoying the faculties in question with our attention given to the objective.
Living in our faculties, objectively orientated, we can learn both the particularity and generality of their objectives after the manner outlined above. But our ability to pass from the particular to the general suggests, and upon enquiry reveals, that the objective commonality of particular with general and of a priori's of different degrees of a priority with one another, is dependent upon a subjective commonality of faculties in consciousness. Our first transition from entities to generalities, like our later transitions from generalities to generalities of higher degree, is made in virtue of a meaning which these entities like these generalities reveal. The meaning of an entity is the entity as we are conscious of it. Entities as we are conscious of them are not entities but objects in consciousness. Objects in consciousness are phenomena. Phenomena are the system of faculties constructed in consciousness out of acts of intention and intentions to which the acts refer, out of a certain synthesis of elements, each of which taken by itself is intentional—that is to say, consistent of noesis and noema. But consciousness is not usually conscious of itself but of entities. Consciousness can only become conscious of itself under introspection..., and at this point is needed the comparison of phenomenological with psychological method.

Psychology, like logic, can provide a means of approach to the study of phenomena, but as it is usually conceived and carried on its scope is perfectly distinct from the scope of phenomenology.

William James placed psychology among the objective sciences. "The mind which the psychologist studies, he wrote, is the mind of distinct individuals inhabiting definite portions of a real space and time. With any other sort of mind, absolute intelligence, mind unattached to a particular body, or mind not subject to the course of time, the psychologist as such has nothing to do. "Mind" in his mouth is only a class name for
minds. . . . To the psychologist . . . the minds he studies are objects in a world of other objects. Even when he introspectively analyses his own mind, and tells what he finds there, he talks about it in an objective way.** Accepting this definition of mind, mind is not the concern of phenomenological investigation. Mind, says James, is a class name for minds. But minds are entities presented to consciousness. The fact that they are presented to it in a different way to that in which most, if not all, other entities are presented must not be allowed to obscure the fact that they are presented as objects and must be taken to be entities in themselves. I have already spoken of self-consciousness as a faculty. It is unfortunate that consideration of the fact that we owe our apprehension of other minds in the first instance to our apprehension of our own mind has misled many people into supposing that the study of our own mind is a subjective study. It has seemed to many people that here is the supreme illustration of a doctrine after whose truth they have long been searching, the doctrine that, since we can never reach beyond our consciousness of objects to these objects themselves, if indeed there may be any such, if we can never reach beyond our consciousness of objects to these objects themselves, if indeed there may be any such, if we want to understand what we call the nature and relation of those objects, we must look, not outward, but inward, into the nature and relation of our experiences. If it is true, they argue, that we are limited to our own experiences in the matter of apprehending what we call the experiences of other people, the same must be true of our apprehension of all objects. In every case we are limited to our experiences. Den Weltlauf zu berechnen, turn to psychology! There in the terms of a history of the experiences of the individual, and an analysis of these experiences into component parts, you will find, say they, the stuff of which the universe is made. Now, while the successful psychologist knows well enough what are the limitations of his field, the

discovery of the possibility of psychological research has served for many people to cover over the entrance to the subjective sphere. But the experiences which the psychologist observes are objects. It is only comparatively lately that men have learned to enjoy at all exclusively the faculty of self-consciousness. A somewhat undistinguished awareness of self is, perhaps, the usual accompaniment of all but the most absorbing awareness of other entities. Indeed, it has sometimes happened that observations purporting to be made concerning other entities have been rendered inaccurate by the introduction of objective elements belonging to the self, an unrecognized awareness of which accompanied the awareness of the entities in question.

One of the first abilities which the scientist must acquire is the ability to exclude all foreign elements from the one objective sphere which he wishes to examine.

It is to be regretted that the word subjective has almost invariably been employed to designate the characteristics of experiences which the scientist must be taught to exclude, among other foreign elements, from the sphere on which he is intent.

"Subjective qualities" has become a catch word, signifying personal conditions involved in the experience of objects. Distinguish that which the object is in itself from what are merely the subjective conditions of your own perception of it, is often the advice given to one bent on objective discoveries. But the advice should be differently worded. Do not, it should run, confuse the elements of the one objective sphere of real experiences with the elements of the different objective sphere which you are investigating. That the elements belonging to real experiences were not recognized for a long time to belong to an objective sphere with characteristics of its own is a poor reason for calling them subjective now. And there is even less excuse, when at last their own sphere has been discovered, for
calling them subjective because they happen to be the experiences of persons whom we sometimes call subjects.

We have now learned to enjoy the faculty of self-consciousness in a purity sufficient to support a science. It may be said that, in order to become self-conscious, it is necessary to change the interest of consciousness from objects of experience to experience of objects. But this explanation obscures the actual change in faculties which must be undertaken. The change is no mere change in interest. In order to be conscious of myself I have to live through a faculty different to all those through which other entities are presented to me. If a man determined to pass his time in an illusory world of his own fancy, he could succeed in doing so to the degree in which he succeeded in displacing the faculty of perception in favour of the faculty of imagination. Similarly, if a man would be conscious of himself, he must displace the faculties which present him with other objects. By the self is meant here that empirical self whose history can be written in a history of the sequence of real experiences which constitute that self. If this empirical self were not an unity one would not be able to speak of one faculty of self-consciousness, but would be obliged to suppose that there were as many selves as there were faculties. One could not then speak of self-consciousness as accompanying the enjoyment of other faculties, in the way, for instance, that imagination can accompany memory, so that there may often be some difficulty in disentangling their objects from one another. One would be obliged, on the contrary, to suppose that self-consciousness was an element or constituent in those faculties, which otherwise one would say that it accompanied, and that the self itself was a part of every entity with which our various faculties presented us. The empirical self in its completeness is the object which psychology must describe. The self is an unity, while its experiences are many, but the empirical self "exists" nowhere
else than in the experiences which are, rather misleadingly, called its own. The identity of the self is not static but dynamic, a developing or growing unity which can be recognized to comprise each real experience in turn. What the psychologist cultivates, and what his so-called introspection procures him, is self-consciousness—that is, an awareness of his self; what it does not procure for him is reflexive consciousness—that is, consciousness aware of itself. Self-consciousness is an awareness of real experiences. Real experiences are entities which are particular in their psychical existence as physical objects are particular in their physical existence. Like the physical entities, these psychical entities are capable of objective variation and abstraction. Like them they can sustain an a priori of their several types.

Psychology can contribute the histories of empirical selves, sequences of experiences in the sense explained in which the self is identified in turn with each experience, which in a manner "contains" all those which preceded it, and an a priori of the possible development of empirical selves in general. It can contribute analyses of particular real experiences, and an a priori of the types of real experience. And, in its social aspect, it can contribute an account of the relations of empirical selves to one another, and an a priori of all possible empirical society. But in doing all this it presupposes, like every other natural science, the use of objectifying consciousness and the enjoyment of its particular faculty. It surveys entities and it presupposes the phenomenal activity of consciousness in virtue of which alone these entities are presented to it. That self-consciousness is not consciousness conscious of itself becomes evident in consideration that I am obliged to put an ego in the position of "pole" to my self-consciousness. I, I am compelled to say, am conscious of myself. Now, if this ego-pole were a part of the self, I could never become conscious of myself. But
this ego-pole is perfectly distinct from myself. It is as it were only the token of consciousness at work. It is the pole from which the intention of consciousness itself proceeds. It is the ego which "acts" in the phenomenological sense.

My empirical self is not concerned at all when I, the pure ego, become conscious of consciousness, unless, indeed, it be concerned, not as it is as an entity in itself, but as it is as an object of consciousness, as a phenomenon.

The psychological a priori, then, no less than the logical a priori, needs the ultimate foundation which phenomenology can provide in the form of a description of the intentional processes in which the pure ego constructs its consciousness of those experiences which are the empirical self. In this description care must be exercised to exclude every fact belonging to the psychical existence of those entities which are experiences, and every law which in the variation and abstraction of these showed itself to be applicable to them. The temptation to include these objective facts and a priori's is parallel to the temptation to include the facts and a priori's of logic. These two bodies of objective knowledge are alike in that they each possess the most ultimate comprehension of which objective bodies of knowledge are capable. Each of them is, in my former image, the feathers of the arrow of objectivity. You can travel no further back towards the subjective, unless you leave the arrow and turn to the bow which discharged it. Psychology resembles logic in this too, that being viewed for what it is, an objective science, it rivals logic in demonstrating more forcibly than the other objective sciences, that ground of consciousness itself in which they are all enrooted. Just as every entity has a meaning and the science of meanings (that is, logic) indicated more plainly than any other science, in what sphere, namely, the subjective, the origin or meaning of meaning is to be found; so as every object is an object to some experience, the science of experiences,
which is psychology, should indicate more plainly than any other science, in what sphere, namely, the subjective, is to be found the nature or experience of experience which is consciousness itself.

Psychology, then, is a science of minds, and even that mind in general which it may succeed in abstracting by variation of the individual minds which are the entities it observes, has a reference to, and derives all its significance from, those objective entities. But Phenomenology is a science of the one subjective sphere, of subjectivity itself—that is to say, pure consciousness. Consciousness is called "pure" when it is free from all awareness of objects. Just as the natural scientist has to learn to concentrate exclusively upon whatever one objective sphere he makes his aim, as the psychologist, for his part, has to regard exclusively that one objective sphere which consists of real experiences, so the phenomenologist must concentrate upon the subjective and exclude all else from his concern. The phenomenologist must put the whole objective world "within inverted commas." He must shut out from his attention within a stringent ἔσχεσθε every sphere of being with which objectively directed consciousness can have to do. Does it seem that such a radical exclusion can leave only a bare ego-pole and nothing with content to be examined? Does it seem that if the inclination to hypostasis be overcome, and no concrete particularities, no elements and no laws, be brought over from the objective into the subjective sphere, nothing will be found there to describe? Does it seem that when all realities, physical and psychical, all goods, all truths, all beauties, and every possible entity are confined within brackets and forbidden to trespass, we, if indeed we may consider ourselves to escape the boundaries of this limitation, shall be left face to face with unimaginable blank vacuity? The fact is contrary. We, being understood no longer now as persons, individuals of self-conscious experience, but as egos merely, instances of pure consciousness, consciousness
reflective to itself, are left with an overwhelming, an infinitely large, field of research, having indeed no entities themselves before us, but our consciousness of every entity. We have before us now not realities psychical and physical, not goods, not truths, not beauties, but all and every one of these as we are conscious of them. Considered noematically these are objects in consciousness; considered noetically these are the construction of objects in consciousness. Objects in consciousness are the means of our being aware of entities, and they are that means because they are themselves intentional, in intending them we intend beyond them. The intentional structure of consciousness, the whole system of noesis to noema, remains hidden from the ordinary level of conscious life. It is because it intends beyond itself that we are aware not of consciousness but of entities. But consciousness is capable of its own revelation. As soon as we succeed in living in a faculty and yet excluding from our present awareness the entities with which it can present us, we become aware of our consciousness itself—that is, of the faculty in operation. The faculty in operation reveals itself to be the objects in consciousness and the acts of intending them which these imply.

Now the defence of the phenomenological introspection, which is not an introspection in the psychological sense of having an awareness of real experiences, but an actual reflexion, consciousness ceasing to be an awareness of any object and becoming conscious of itself, must rest not upon any "philosophical" justification, but upon its actual ability to be practised. The traditional arguments, such, for instance, as were brought against the practice of introspection by Comte and J. S. Mill, referred to psychological introspection and the difficulties involved in becoming self-conscious. It were better, perhaps, if the practice of concentrating upon self-consciousness were not called introspection. In examining a real perceptive
experience, for example, my purpose must be to observe that which I either was aware of, or could have been aware of, in the factual experience of perceiving the object in question. My purpose must be to become aware of myself as I either was or might have been aware of it in the experience. To the degree that I was self-conscious at the time of the perception, to that degree I do not have to change the faculty I was enjoying, or realize an object in awareness of which I was not then aware. On the other hand, to the degree that I wish now, as psychologist, to examine in addition to the amount of self of which I was aware, the whole amount of self of which I might have been aware, to that degree I do have to realize a new object. This I can only do by ceasing to enjoy, or not repeating the enjoyment of, the faculty of perception, and by developing to its utmost extent the enjoyment of the faculty of self-consciousness. This was the awareness of the self as a self-perceiving such-and-such entities, and was either being partially enjoyed, or, in the rare instance of total absorption in awareness of the entities, not being enjoyed at all. If that self-consciousness is to be called introspection which the psychologist achieves, by remembering that amount of self-awareness which was already involved, and by completing the enjoyment of a faculty which was being at most, only partially enjoyed before, then it must be distinguished from phenomenological introspection by being recognized to be no case of reflexive consciousness. Psychological introspection does not reflect upon what was implicit in consciousness and is now, under the reflection, become explicit to consciousness. On the contrary! To the degree that it uses memory, it brings what was already an object of awareness (namely, part of the empirical self as perceiving) into the fuller notice of a now undivided attention. While to the degree that it becomes aware for the first time of the perceiving self, memory either not being used at all or being re-
inforced now by original experience, it compels the psychologist to cease the enjoyment of the perceptive faculty in which he was living, and to live in a faculty in which before he was not living. But the phenomenological introspection is reflexive. By its means what was implicit in consciousness itself is made explicit to consciousness. The consciousness exactly as it was then in process becomes now, for the first time, conscious of itself. That same faculty which was enjoyed before, the faculty of perception, for instance, intertwined, it may have been, with a partial enjoyment of the faculty of self-consciousness, is enjoyed again. Only this time is the direction of the attention changed, involving a cessation of awareness of entities, and the inception of a consciousness of the immanent structure of the faculty itself. It is to this kind of introspection, which is reflexive consciousness, that those writers have referred, who, like Cousin and Brentano, have taken the highest ground in its defence. But phenomenological introspection relies for its ultimate justification upon its practice. It is possible while living continuously in the enjoyment of one faculty, or plurality of faculties, to turn the attention backwards and forwards, from awareness of entities to consciousness of consciousness, from awareness of transcendent objects to consciousness of immanent phenomena. The revelation of identity in both the one and the other, together with the constancy of the relation between them, which this change of attention shows, proves that phenomenological introspection is as directly reflexive as it claims. And concerning the identity claimed in the repetition of similar experiences, since phenomenology refers to actual consciousness and not to factual experiences, it can disregard the numerical and particular differences in these, when it asserts the sameness of the phenomenal processes.

This brings me to the conclusion of my paper. In refusing the easier task of offering an historical account of the develop-
ment of Husserl's views with reference to his particular writings, and in undertaking the more difficult, but I hope more interesting, and certainly more provocative, attempt to state as uncompromisingly as possible the fundamental principles of phenomenological philosophy, I have been obliged to present crudely very much that needs a finer argument. For this I must ask the indulgence of the Society. And, since the attempt has involved radical restrictions of personal interpretation, I cannot claim Husserl's authority for all that it has presented. But while the responsibility for the views I have expressed must be regarded as mine only, I am, of course, indebted to Husserl for their bias. If, therefore, the praise for what conceptions may have seemed praiseworthy be attributed to Husserl, and the blame for what has seemed ignorantly stated or indefensible be given to me, your criticism will have been, at least, justly administered.