Wednesday, June 12th

Session 1

The Embodied Self: An Ethics of Community
Michael F. Andrews (University of Portland, USA)

Edith Stein’s critique of Husserl’s strict monadological model of constitution leads her to reject Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology based on her conviction that the community in fact precedes the individual ego in the order of experience. Stein’s reciprocal model of empathy entails a dialogical relationship based on mutuality, care, and interdependence. Such a dialogical model of empathy appears to violate Husserl’s strict monadological methodology, in that it would necessitate that ego and alter ego are equi-primordial, co-constitutive, and co-given. My argument is that the primordial role that Edith Stein assigns to community presupposes as a condition of possibility the embodied existence of a social world, a “We-world.” Individual and community, I and Other, are embodied subjects reciprocally co-constituted in an intersubjective nexus of higher-order cultural sciences. Such spiritual values posit a current from which every Ego originates, fades, and re-enlivens itself. Consequently, empathy is both a condition of possible knowledge of the existing outer world and the horizon of embodiment that makes ethics possible.

IASPES Keynote Address

From the “Neutral” Human Being to Gender Difference: Phenomenological and Dual Anthropology in Edith Stein
Angela Ales Bello (Lateran University, Italy)

Edith Stein maintains, on one hand, following Husserl’s lead, that phenomenology can account for the universality of the structure of the human being and can give an essential description of the “phenomenon.” On the other hand, she is sensitive to the claims of the feminist movement and believes it is necessary to deepen the difference between male and female by not only describing what constitutes the feminine but also what constitutes the masculine. In doing so, Stein brings something new to the philosophical discourse. Additionally, she defends a view concerning the singularity of the human being in which both male and female are present.
Session 2

Validity as Justice in Reinach’s Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law
David Koepsell (Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands)

The problem of Justice is that of linking the selection of positive laws with that which is somehow “right” in some ideal, ethical sense. It has been approached alternatively as something solvable by recourse to “natural” law, and as unsolvable except by recognizing that positive law is all that matters - that our enactments alone ground the justice of our institutions. Neither natural law theory nor legal positivism represents the way that our actual legal systems approach problems of justice. On the one hand, positive enactments often contradict past practices and beliefs, suggesting that the natural law, if there is one, is elusive at best. On the other hand, universally reviled acts, even when not illegal (e.g. The Nuremberg “Doctors” trials) are treated as capable of legal punishment regardless of the positive law. Reinach offers us an alternate approach through a phenomenological investigation of the states of affairs pertaining to certain acts and relations. In The Apriori Foundations of the Civil Law, he examines the necessary states of affairs that precede the positive law, grounding what he terms “validly” certain legal institutions such as “owning” and the fundamental elements of contracts: claims and obligations. He utilizes expertly the phenomenological reduction to show that particular laws are grounded in certain states of affairs. Reinach spends quite some time distinguishing the apriori theory of right from both natural law and positivism. In this paper, I will explain the distinctions between Reinach’s apriorism, natural law theory, and modern postivism, extend Reinach’s approach to the problem of Justice, contrast it with modern approaches, a la Rawls, and provide a blueprint for developing a phenomenology of Justice in the vein of Reinach’s early work.

Harmonizing Scheler and Kant
Andrew Pfeuffer (Franciscan University of Steubenville, USA)

Kant’s influence on Scheler cannot be underestimated, yet Scheler exposed many of the shortcomings with Kantian ethics. By saying that each person acts morally well in a situation by doing exactly what any rational being would do in that situation and thus reducing the person to a generic, fungible agent, Kant closed himself off from a rich domain of the moral sphere. While many would argue that Kant is simply willing to pay the necessary, albeit high, price of establishing a basis for morality which is not contingent or subjective, Scheler presents a unique solution through his phenomenological approach that allows this abandoned frontier of the moral landscape to be reclaimed, namely the domain in which each person is called to act in an eminently personal way, that is, in a way proper to himself and not necessarily valid for all persons. Given that Scheler’s ethics were written largely as a polemic critique of Kant, one must wonder if any kind of reconciliation is possible. The goal of this paper is to examine the departure of Scheler from Kant, and to try to find some commonality between the Schelerian personal call and the Kantian universal imperative to see if any kind of reconciliation is possible.
Emotions and Cognitions: The Evolution of the Theory of Emotions in the First Husserl
Maria Gyemant (University of Liège, Belgium)

In the Fifth Logical Investigation, after a series of objections to Brentano’s thesis that presentations constitute the most basic type of mental acts, Husserl offers the alternative of a fundamental distinction between objectifying and non-objectifying mental acts. Objectifying acts include the first two Brentanian classes: presentations and judgments. Thus the class of emotions is singled out as the typical model for non-objectifying acts. However, Husserl changes his mind on this issue. We find a new and rather surprising theory of emotions in Ideas I. In §117 for instance, Husserl states clearly that all acts, emotions included, are objectifying because they all constitute objects. The only difference between emotions and cognitions is that emotions constitute values as their objects. Since all mental acts are objectifying, the difference is now between kinds of objects rather than kinds of acts.

It seems, however, that the role values play in our mental life is more complicated. Not only are they dependent objects constructed from objects of simple presentations or judgments, but they are also the sort of objects that can motivate other acts. So, while for Husserl emotions are always dependent on cognitions, insofar as wanting something necessarily supposes a previous presentation of that thing, as in Brentano, certain emotions can also play a foundational role for cognitions. Hence the question to be addressed in this paper: is the relation between emotions and cognitions a symmetrical one since both can play the role of foundational act for the other? And if this is the case what is the specificity of emotions as mental acts and how can they be distinguished from cognitions?

Session 3

Ingarden’s Theory of Perception
Genki Uemura (Rissho University, Japan)

The aim of the present paper is to explicate Roman Ingarden’s theory of perception or perceptual experience with reference to contemporary philosophical discussions on perception. According to Ingarden, perceptual experiences are a kind of intentional experience. Hence, applying his general theory of intentionality, he considers perceptual experiences to have “purely intentional objects [rein intentionale Gegenstände],” which are different in kind from physical objects in the world. In the main part of this paper, I shall argue that Ingarden’s theory can be understood as a hybrid of projectivism and intentionalism. On the one hand, it has a projectivist aspect in that it offers a partial explanation of the presentational character of perceptual experience by means of projection. On the other hand, it has an intentionalist aspect in that it admits projection to have veridicality conditions. In conclusion, I point out that Ingarden’s whole discussion of perceptual intentionality rests on another element of his theory of perceptual experience, namely discussions of “sensed contents [empfundene Inhalte].”
Jean Hering and the Introduction of Husserl's Phenomenology to France
Christian Dupont (Independent scholar)

The Alsatian philosopher and theologian Jean Hering (1890-1966) played a pivotal role in introducing phenomenology to France during the late 1920s and beyond. An integral member of Husserl’s Göttingen Circle from 1909 through the outbreak of World War I, Hering later joined the Faculty of Protestant Theology in Strasbourg. There he continued his association with Husserl, who regarded him as one of his most faithful disciples. In 1925, Hering defended his own pioneering thesis, *Phénoménologie et philosophie religieuse*, published in Paris the following year. In the meantime, a French translation appeared of a critique of Husserl’s early works by the Russian emigrant philosopher Lev Shestov, prompting Hering to counter with an essay in Husserl’s defense. Shestov’s reply and Hering’s subsequent rebuttal furthered both their debate and, moreover, awareness of Husserl’s phenomenology in France, which was otherwise being introduced through programmatic assessments of contemporary trends in German and French philosophy by Bernard Groethuysen and Georges Gurvitch. This paper situates Hering’s appraisals and employment of Husserlian phenomenology among these other interpretations and will also reflect on the significance of Hering’s role in facilitating personal encounters of other French-speaking philosophers like Emmanuel Levinas with Husserl.

Thursday, June 13th

Session 1

Toward an Ontology of States of Affairs
Mark Roberts (Franciscan University of Steubenville, USA)

In the first part of this paper, I make a number of terminological distinctions, followed by a more thorough justification of the distinction, between acts of judging, sentences, propositions, and states of affairs. I argue that propositions are truth *bearers* while states of affairs are truth *makers*. This argument relies heavily on a logical analysis of the copula of propositions although the copula function varies depending upon whether a proposition is a categorical or non-categorical. I especially rely here on the work of Pfänder and Reinach.

In the second part of the paper I analyze in more detail the ontology or being of states of affairs. Here I depart from Reinach and others outside of phenomenology by arguing that there are only obtaining states of affairs and no possible states of affairs; that they can be ontically located in the world; and while there are negative as well as positive states of affairs, there is an ontological dependence of negative states of affairs on positive ones.
The Receptive Transcendence of Knowledge: Towards a Contentful Notion of “Early Phenomenology”
Josef Seifert (International Academy of Philosophy, Spain)

There is a purely historical notion of “Early Phenomenology” – from the late 19th century to 1939. During this period Husserl’s move towards transcendental phenomenology led to the break between him and almost the entire Göttingen and Munich circles of phenomenologists. Evidence about the essence of knowledge, especially of a priori knowledge of essences and states of affairs grounded in them, but also the phenomenological cogito-argument, shows that the act of cognition is characterized by a transcendent receptive grasp of beings, essences, principles of ontology and logic, and other data that are autonomously existing “in themselves” and yet clearly given in intentional cognitive acts as being irreducible to noemas and purely intentional and constituted objects of conscious acts. The transcendence of the act of knowledge rejected by Husserl from 1905 on, and its strong defense by some phenomenologists, leads to a contentful concept of “early phenomenology” as an objectivist and realist phenomenology. Such a “phenomenology of cognitive transcendence” was defended in the ‘Prolegomena’ of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, various works of Scheler, Reinach, Hildebrand, and others, leading to a deep break within the phenomenological movement and to the birth of phenomenological realism. It will be argued that, far from constituting a “naive realism,” a Bilderbuchphänomenologie, or a pure “dogmatism” and Weltanschauungsphilosophie opposed to rigorously “scientific phenomenology,” a phenomenology based on the discovery of the transcendence of man in knowledge constitutes the only properly critical phenomenology faithful to things themselves as given to the mind, and that it did not end in 1939 but continues to exist today.

The Roots of Husserl’s Divergences in the School of Brentano
Peter Andras Varga (Husserl-Archives, University of Cologne, Germany)

“Without Brentano,” Husserl is alleged to have said in 1932, “I would have never written any word of philosophy.” Husserl undoubtedly considered himself as being influenced by Brentano, and, at least since the publication of an obituary volume by Oskar Kraus in 1919, Husserl’s Brentanian lineage has become a part of the received view of the history of phenomenology. However, Husserl’s conflicts with the orthodox core of the School of Brentano, which are visible even in Kraus’ volume, raises the question of whether this characterization suffices to adequately grasp the context of Husserl’s early philosophy. In my presentation I focus on an aspect that significantly constrains Husserl’s adherence to Brentano. Analysing the complex network of Austrian university philosophy in the late 19th century, I show that Husserl was in connection with philosophers who had biographical ties to Bolzano but whose views were marked by a general Herbartianism which prevailed in Austria. In order to demonstrate the impact of these influences on Husserl’s phenomenology I analyse Husserl’s mid-1894 text written against Twardowski, which is considered the key text of his entry into the Brentanian debate on intentionality, to show the extent to which Husserl’s own notion of intentionality was shaped by his background in Austrian university philosophy. This background consists in views on the contents and objects of presentations that place an important constraint on Husserl’s adherence to Brentano.
Session 2

Brentano’s Aristotle and the Intentional Definition of Mental Phenomena
Charlene Elsby (McMaster University, Canada)

Brentano’s definition of the intentionality of mental phenomena in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* pervades early phenomenology, but it was also criticized due to the fact that Brentano defines mental phenomena in ways which cast doubt on the reality of the content of mental phenomena. If the content of a mental phenomenon is another mental phenomenon, then Brentano is subject to the criticism that his definition is infinitely recursive. Brentano’s position regarding the reality of the contents of mental phenomena can be traced back to his interpretation of Aristotle’s conception of the perception that we perceive from *De Anima* III.2. Brentano interprets Aristotle as differentiating inner sense from outer sense, and results in his eventual description of the contents of mental phenomena as being the only real things: “We said that mental phenomena are those phenomena which alone can be perceived in the strict sense of the word…they are those phenomena which alone possess real existence as well as intentional existence.” This echoes his interpretation of Aristotle in *The Psychology of Aristotle*, where he states: “If we now ask what the proper object of sense is, it is plain that we must identify this object with our sensation. Its object is not the external thing.” Brentano attempts to save the intentional definition of mental phenomena by allowing physical objects as contents of mental phenomena, and creating the *in recto, in obliquo* distinction between mental references to real and merely mental objects, but he would not have to if he did not start with his odd interpretation of Aristotle.

Leonard Nelson’s Challenge to Phenomenology, and a (Husserlian) Response
Biagio Tassone (Catholic University of America, USA)

While still establishing the theoretical framework for his phenomenology at Göttingen, Husserl worked alongside Leonard Nelson. Although Husserl and Nelson shared students, they never collaborated. This is somewhat surprising, since the two thinkers had a great deal in common. Nelson, like Husserl, believed that rigorous and reliable knowledge claims should be established through immediate knowledge and insight. Also, like Husserl, Nelson held that immediate knowledge should be the ground of synthetic propositions or truths that form the basis for theoretical thought and knowledge claims about the makeup of the world. Unlike Husserl, however, Nelson was convinced that access to immediate grounds of certainty and truth were not intuitive and direct but instead mediated truths and therefore only implicitly apprehended in immediate experience. The two therefore end up with very different and incompatible methodologies. If Nelson is right, then the immediate insight Husserl demanded, and introduced his methods of reduction to attain, is impossible. If Husserl is correct, then Nelson’s anti-intuitive foundationalism is incoherent. In this paper I will attempt to show what Nelson’s neo-Friesian approach and Husserl’s phenomenological one might have gained from critical interaction. Although Nelson’s criticism of Husserl’s intuitionism and traditional epistemology has some truth to it, I maintain that Husserl is correct to stress the justification of insights on epistemological grounds but that there may be greater truth in Nelson’s claims about the representational nature of immediate knowledge.
From Act Psychology to Phenomenology: Husserl’s view of mental acts from the Logical Investigations to Ideas
Ben Sheredos (University of California San Diego, USA)

Early 20th century authors tell of a school of thought called Act Psychology (“AP”). While the precise doctrines of AP were rarely stated clearly, the core claim, as expressed by Edwin Boring, was that the notions of \textit{intentionality}, \textit{immanent objectivity}, and \textit{intentional inexistence} “become intelligible only when it is realized that psychical phenomena are to be thought of as \textit{acts}.” Brentano and Husserl were widely cited as practitioners of AP, but their conceptions of mental acts are not readily apparent. Brentano’s works in “descriptive psychology” never straightforwardly addressed the status of mental acts \textit{qua} acts. Husserl’s \textit{Logical Investigations} paint a puzzling picture of mental acts. On one hand, he distinguishes “narrow” and “broad” senses of intentionality in characterizing two important varieties of mental acts (\textit{meaning-intentions} and \textit{fulfilling-intentions}, respectively). Yet he declares: “In talking of ‘acts’… we must steer clear of the word’s original meaning: \textit{all thought of activity must be rigidly excluded}.” When Husserl drafted the \textit{Logical Investigations} in 1899, he considered them a work in descriptive psychology. After their publication, Husserl recanted, but mental acts remained central to his view as he set about clarifying the distinct project of phenomenology in \textit{Ideas}. The purpose of this talk is to examine Husserl’s shifting conceptions of mental acts, to contrast these with the incipient account we can dig out of Brentano, and to argue that Husserl’s later conception of mental acts is central to his transcendental phenomenology. I argue that Husserl’s turnabout regarding the distinction of the pure ego from the empirical ego radically altered his conception of mental acts, and I show how this illuminates the split between AP and phenomenology.

Session 3

Selections from Gustav Shpet’s Consciousness and Its Owner (1916)
Thomas Nemeth (Independent scholar)

“Consciousness and Its Owner” appeared in a \textit{Festschrift} for G. I. Chelpanov, who had been Shpet’s professor first in Kiev and then in Moscow. The thesis developed herein takes exception with Husserl’s abandonment in \textit{Ideen I} of his own earlier non-egological conception of consciousness. In this respect, Shpet’s essay foreshadows a position that would later gain prominence in the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Aron Gurwitsch, though there is no reason to think that either knew of Shpet’s much earlier arguments. What follows is an abridged presentation of the first English translation from Russian of Shpet’s essay.
NASEP Keynote Address

Speculations about Bridging the Göttingen-Freiburg Gap in Phenomenology
Lester Embree (Florida Atlantic University, USA)

The question is somewhat explored of just whether there is a gap and if so what it is and how much it involves Husserl’s transcendental turn and how much other factors are involved, e.g., the war and post-war conditions in Germany. Then it is urged that devotees to the histories of the two stages consider the contributions of the other stages in the shared perspective of pure phenomenological psychology. But above all it is urged that devotees of both stages engage not just in studying an interesting movement in 20th century of philosophy but prove phenomenology is not dead but still alive by engaging in doing it.

Friday, June 14th

Session 1

Another reading of Derrida’s reading of Husserl: Towards the question of ‘Phenomenological Language’
Vedran Grahovac (University of Guelph, Canada)

In this paper I will examine Derrida’s criticism of Husserl’s theory of meaning, sign and expression in the First Logical Investigation. In doing so, I will closely address James Dodd’s article “The Depth of Signs: Three Texts on Language from Edmund Husserl’s Revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation.” I will show that an explicit answer to Derrida’s criticism in Speech and Phenomena can be found already in Husserl’s 1914 Revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation from, and then ‘answer’ Derrida’s position on the inherent ‘metaphysics of presence’ in Husserl by referring back to the determination of the argumentative style of the 1900-1901 LU. As I shall demonstrate, Husserl’s theory of the indicative aspect of signs in the First Investigation ‘already’ offers an adequate response to Derrida, and the tension obtained with the meaning-intention/meaning-fulfillment differentiation explicitly avoids Derrida’s accusation of the necessity of living presence in the self-repetition of ideal categories in Husserl. By insisting on the ‘rigidity’ of ideal rules and structures, Husserl is able to ‘escape’ the formality of metaphysical dualism. Only the constancy of the rift between the sign-meaning, meaning-intention/meaning-fulfillment polarities avoids the possibility that the poles can be either reconciled or subsumed by each other within a certain sort of a ‘metaphysical’ unity. Husserl remains faithful to the self-encircling of the above-mentioned polarities, even (or precisely) when he introduces the phenomenology of the ‘depth of signs’ in the later revisions of his LU.
On the manifold meaning of value according to Dietrich von Hildebrand
Rogelio Rovira (Complutense University of Madrid, Spain)

The basic contribution of Dietrich von Hildebrand to phenomenological axiology can be summarized as follows: the concept of value is, in one sense, narrower than phenomenologists such as Scheler or Hartmann have suggested; but, in another sense, is wider than any phenomenologist has believed necessary to defend. On the one hand, Hildebrand affirms that the name of value can only be properly applied to “the intrinsically important”. On the other hand, Hildebrand argues that the intrinsically important has to be described phenomenologically in its pure qualitative content and in its relation to being. Thus, four kinds of specifically distinct values appear: (1) the qualitative values; (2) the ontological values; (3) the values of perfection or technical values; and finally (4) the formal value of “being something”.

Hildebrand’s contribution poses a difficult question: What unity do these several meanings of value have such that it is legitimate to attribute the same term to data so diverse? Hildebrand himself has not dealt with this question. However, the mere indication of the problem suggests that any solution requires a rigorous logic of the concept “value” as a precursor to the construction of an indispensable metaphysics of the bonum.

Crossing the Continental Divide: Husserlian Rapprochement
John K. O’Connor (Colorado State University-Pueblo, USA)

In this project I argue against Friedman’s (2000) thesis that Ernst Cassirer is the ideal source for rapprochement between the analytic and continental traditions. At best, his claim needs supplementation, as there is at least one other philosopher poised to fulfill this role: Edmund Husserl. The resources provided by Husserlian phenomenology are at least as valuable for bridging the divide as those of late Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism. While claims of a pre-1933 analytic/continental schism are anachronistic and exaggerated, nevertheless harbingers of the split can be seen in the conflict between Carnap and Heidegger over the priority of logic. Despite these tensions, both Heidegger and Carnap were clearly influenced by Husserlian phenomenology. Even more to the point, Husserl, Heidegger, and Carnap all attempt to distinguish themselves from Neo-Kantianism. Certainly there are clear differences between these three thinkers. However, Husserl’s phenomenology allows us to see how: a) with Carnap, philosophy can be developed into a logic of the natural sciences and; b) how with Heidegger, logical or formal structures are not properly imposed from without, but are rather always already embedded in concrete experience.
Session 2

Intention and Intentionality
Brian Donohue (SUNY Buffalo, USA)

This paper will present three theses. The first is that the suggestion that the phenomenological usage of ‘intentionality’ is technical, and so should be kept separate from the everyday practical sense of the word ‘intention,’’ is misguided. The suggestion stems in part from a characterization of intention as being future-oriented, or as especially concerned with goals and purposes; the matter becomes clearer if one begins to consider intentional actions, which may nonetheless have no “further (or future-oriented) intention” in them. The second thesis is that the notion of an intentional object has been confused with that of an intentional entity due to a shift in the meaning of ‘object’ in the history of philosophy. The third thesis is that Herbert Spiegelberg’s historical study of intention and intentionality in the scholastics, Brentano, and Husserl skews its depiction of the scholastics by unduly singling out “extra-practical intention,” as well as misstates the discrepancies between the medieval and phenomenological usages of ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’ due to an unnoticed equivocation on ‘object’ throughout the analysis.

Peirce and Husserl: Connections at the Turn of the Century
Aaron Massecar (King’s University College, Canada)

Sifting through the Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce, one can find a few mentions of the work of Edmund Husserl. In particular, Peirce mentions Husserl’s Logical Investigations in 1906 (CP IV.7). But the connections between these two thinkers span more than simply a passing reference; there are numerous points of overlap between the two, from the use of the word phenomenology to their theory of signs and their understanding of logic. The secondary literature, which seems to be undergoing a resurgence in the past five to six years (Stjernfelt 2007, Perilli 2010, Broekman 2010), examines this relationship in more detail than a single paper could permit. Although all of the intricacies of their overlapping thought could not be worked out in a single volume let alone a single paper, there is enough room here to highlight some of the main similarities between the two thinkers. The following paper will have three sections. First, there will be a general overview of Peirce’s phenomenology. This will be followed by a review of the secondary literature on the Peirce-Husserl relation. The final section will focus on the nature of logic as a part of Peirce’s phenomenology. The purpose of this paper is to examine to what extent we can consider Peirce as part of the early phenomenological movement, and to examine the contributions that Peirce’s work can make towards reawakening some of the insights of early phenomenology that are absent from how we conceive of phenomenology today.