The Great Phenomenological Schism: Reactions to Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism

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Keynote Addresses:

Phenomenology, Ontology, and Metaphysics

Hanne Jacobs (Loyola University Chicago)

Husserl’s oft-repeated claim that it belongs to the essence of consciousness to be consciousness of something might seem to be fairly uncontroversial. However, as I will discuss in this paper, this seemingly innocuous statement made by Husserl throughout his work implies at least two further commitments that are certainly controversial. The first commitment is that facts (Tatsachen) have essences (Wesen). And the second commitment is that reality is, in principle, accessible to a correlated consciousness of this reality, which is an idea that lies at the heart of Husserl’s transcendental idealism. After explicating what these commitments amount to and showing how they are indeed implied by Husserl’s claim that it belongs to the essence of consciousness to be consciousness of something, I will address to what extent trying to bypass these commitments might entail giving up on the very idea of intentionality as Husserl understood it as well as on Husserl’s phenomenology and the larger project he considers phenomenology to be part of. That is, and this refers to my title, Husserl’s aim is ultimately to develop a metaphysics and the development of this metaphysics presupposes two distinct eidetic disciplines—namely, phenomenology and ontology.
Paul Natorp’s 1914 review of Husserl’s *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* calls attention to a number of phenomenological principles whose meanings are either less than self-evident or unable independently to stand up to rigorous philosophical criticism. Natorp’s critique of phenomenological ‘reflection’ is particularly important for the significant role it came to play in the history of the phenomenological movement, albeit at second hand. The hand in question belonged to Heidegger. In his lecture courses leading up to *Being and Time*, Heidegger appropriated Natorp’s Neo-Kantian critique of Husserl’s account of the scope of phenomenological reflection for his own hermeneutical purposes. Heidegger’s ontological critique of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, however, fundamentally distorted Natorp’s critique in a manner that has proven to this day a fateful obstacle for a proper understanding of the meaning, function, and critical problem of reflection in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.

Natorp’s critique of phenomenological reflection’s limited capacity to gain access to the lived-moment of lived-experience as lived, the streaming of the stream, without changing it, is appropriated by Heidegger as an indictment of the very possibility of Husserl’s conception of transcendental phenomenology as radical philosophy. For Natorp, on the contrary, the limit of reflection isn’t presented as evidence for an argument against the possibility of transcendental phenomenology as an originary philosophical discipline but as a critical limitation of Husserl’s account of transcendental consciousness; namely, Husserl’s misguided account of it as something that is given absolutely in an otherwise legitimate phenomenological cognition. However, the largely positive reception of Heidegger’s ontological critique of transcendental phenomenology has given rise to the pervasive belief that reflection is intrinsically “objectifying,” together with the conviction that the “objectivation” it brings about is a methodical liability for phenomenology because the most original phenomena are either not objective or pre-objective. Moreover, the conclusion is drawn from these supposed states of affairs that Husserl’s methodological reliance on reflection brings with it an a priori limitation that is at variance with its radical philosophical intentions.

A close look at Natorp’s review will show the source of the problems already hinted at with Heidegger’s appropriation of Natorp. It will also show that there are problems with Natorp’s critique of Husserl’s account of phenomenological reflection. Finally, a consideration of the relevant passages of the book under review will show a systematic gap in the author’s account of the capacity of phenomenological reflection to apprehend essences, especially the essences of unreflectively modified lived-experiences.
Ingarden and the Ontological Critique of Husserl’s Idealism

Sébastien Richard (FNRS - Université libre de Bruxelles)

Roman Ingarden never accepted what he considered to be Husserl’s move from metaphysical realism to idealism. The idealism debate between Husserl and Ingarden rests mainly on Ingarden’s conception of the relationship of priority between ontology and phenomenology. After a brief presentation of the Ingardenian conception of this relationship, I show how Ingarden – in order to clearly identify Husserl’s position as metaphysical idealism – re-interpretated some central phenomenological concepts in an ontological way. In particular:

1) “Constitution” is interpreted as a creative or productive activity able to form intentional objects at will.
2) “Constituted objects” are seen as purely intentional objects with a mode of being separate from real and ideal modes of being.

The result of Ingarden’s ontological analysis is that Husserl’s idealism is not a kind of Berkeleyan idealism, but rather an idealist dependence creationism in which the real world is a purely created intentional object, i.e., a heteronomous, derivative, self-sufficient and dependent object with respect to pure consciousness. In the final part of my talk, I argue that Ingarden did not misunderstand the central concepts of phenomenology, such as constitution, the noema or the reduction, but instead challenged the philosophical range of Husserlian phenomenology.

The Phenomenal Experience of the I. The idea of the I in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Early Ontology of the External World

Ronny Miron (Bar-Ilan University)

One of the prevalent criticisms of the realist strand of the phenomenological school takes aim at their apparent lack of explicit discussions of the I and the issue of transcendentalism. However, this criticism does not hold for the work of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1888-1966), who dealt with precisely these issues in her early book On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External (1916). According to her student Franz Georg Schmücker, in Conrad-Martius’ work we see that “for the first time the subject is released from Kant’s prison.” This statement refers to a fundamental aspect of Conrad-Martius’ approach to the issue of the I, namely, a constitutive aspect of her idea of the I, where it is not restricted to the boundaries of consciousness and is not based on an epistemological study. In this paper I will provide a critical overview the idea of the I in Conrad-Martius’ early oeuvre. I will extricate from Conrad-Martius’ phenomenological analysis of the external world the fundamental dispositions of the I that are implicit in it and will discuss their relationship to the specific spheres of objects that compose the external world. Finally, I will anchor Conrad-Martius’ realist conception of the I in her overall philosophy of Being.
The Key of the First Phenomenological Schism: A Misunderstanding of the Husserlian Account on Ideal Objects

Mariano Crespo (Universidad de Navarra)

Husserl’s conception of ideal objects—which results from the refutation of logical psychologism presented in the Logical Investigations—convinced some of his early disciples that he was presenting a new form of realism. Regardless of the ambiguity of this term, this impression arises, as I will show in this paper, from a twofold misunderstanding. First, there was a misunderstanding of the limits of the phenomenological claims of the Logical Investigations and, second, there was an erroneous belief that ideal objects are to be interpreted in a realist fashion. The classical realist argues that ideal objects are “concepts,” which does not mean, as some of the so-called “realist phenomenologists” have thought, that they are arbitrary fictional products of the intellect. The ultimate source of the great phenomenological schism is not, therefore, so much a reaction to an alleged sudden change in Husserl’s position with respect to transcendental idealism, but rather a misunderstanding of the concept of ideality presented in the Logical Investigations. Further, an alleged “compatibility” between the realist conception of ideality and the Husserlian one is to be found, I argue, in how Husserl addresses the problem of constitution. As Antonio Millán-Puelles has shown, the use of terms such as “constitutive activity” or “genesis” should not be interpreted in a psychologistic way, as though these objects remain absorbed by the reality of the mental processes they are made present by.

The Question of Reality—Scheler’s Husserl critique in ‘Idealism-Realism’

Susi Gottlöber (Maynooth University)

That Scheler always emphasized that he developed his phenomenological method independently from Husserl, is well known. Even though the references in works such as Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die material Wertethik remain surprisingly few, the critical remarks are balanced with references which remain mainly appreciative of Husserl’s philosophical project; e.g. of Husserl’s critique of Kant’s apriori. (Cf. Scheler II, Zhang 266ff) This, however, seems to have changed significantly in his later works; Scheler’s criticisms of Husserl’s position become much more prominent. The following paper intends to investigate Scheler’s position in his late essay ‘Idealism and Realism’. In critiquing the opposition of ‘Bewusstseinsidealismus’ on the one hand and ‘kritischem Realismus’ on the other Scheler explicitly includes Husserl among those who are not able to solve the problem of reality (Scheler IX, 191f); rather, Scheler argues that Husserl, rather than investigating what we mean by this moment of reality and the acts through which reality is given to us, is content with the vague and wrong statement that being real means to ‘to have a place in time’. (Scheler IX, 206f) Husserl, according to Scheler, loses reality completely. Reconstructing Scheler’s position on reality not only gives insight into Scheler’s interpretation of Husserl but it also sheds light on the philosophical concerns of the late Scheler that have received little attention in scholarship mainly due to the attention given to works such Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos.
The Great Phenomenological Schism and the Phenomenological-Existential Schism: A Question of Continuity in the Contemporary Criticism of Husserl’s Move into Transcendental Idealism

George Heffernan (Merrimack College)

It is generally acknowledged that there were two schisms in the early history of the phenomenological movement. The first, the Great Phenomenological Schism, occurred between 1905 and 1913, as many of his contemporaries, for example, Pfänder, Reinach, Stein, and Ingarden, rejected Husserl’s transformation of phenomenology from the descriptive psychology of the Logical Investigations (1900/1901) into the transcendental idealism of Ideas I (1913). The second, the Phenomenological-Existential Schism, happened between 1927 and 1933, as it emerged that with Being and Time (1927) Heidegger’s philosophy had moved away from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of consciousness toward an ontological analytic of human existence as the way to an interpretation of the question of the meaning of Being. This paper is not about the first schism per se or the second schism per se but about the relationship between the two. It suggests that the first schism anticipated the second and the second recapitulated the first, so that, although the first could have occurred without the second, the second would not have happened as it did without the first. It also indicates that the second schism lies temporally much closer to the first schism than has been hitherto appreciated. Above all, the paper seeks an answer to this question: How do the Great Phenomenological Schism and the Phenomenological-Existential Schism illuminate one another philosophically?

A Proposed Modification of Ingarden’s Concept of the Modern Filmic Work of Art

Rob Luzecky (Indiana University – Purdue University Fort Wayne)

While Ingarden’s theses that the literary work of art is a stratified formation that has its ontological basis in material (real) being are well known, there has been very little scholarly attention paid to his remarks on the filmic work of art. In this paper I address this gap in the scholarship on Ingarden’s realist rejoinder to Husserl’s idealism and propose that they be reformulated to more adequately reflect the function of sound in contemporary (sound-synchronized) filmic works of art. With the addition of sound as an essential stratum of the filmic work of art, an analogue is found to the phonetic stratum of the literary work of art, such that the existence of the filmic work of art becomes another arrow in Ingarden’s quiver aimed at Husserl’s idealism. Ingarden (successfully) challenges Husserl’s transcendental idealism through describing the stratified nature of intentionally created entities (i.e., works of art). Specifically, he identifies how the primary stratum of literary works of art involves a spatio-temporally located entity (i.e., the physical book) and how the schematized aspects of this book are realized as cognitive entities. I suggest that Ingarden’s analysis of silent films challenges Husserl’s metaphysical idealism, but his description of sound-synchronized films fall short. I argue that we should modify Ingarden’s identification of sound-synchronized films as having two strata. Were we to add a stratum of represented auditory material (i.e., spoken dialogue) to these, we would gain a more accurate description of the modern filmic work of art that reflects Ingarden’s objection to Husserl’s idealistic turn.
Edith Stein on a Different Motive which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism

Daniele De Santis (Seattle University)

In the early phenomenology, reactions to Husserl’s turn to transcendental idealism assumed two different forms. On one hand, in opposition to Husserl’s “transcendental” agenda, the reactions presented themselves as attempts to develop further an idea of phenomenology (whether ontological or realist) which was considered to be faithful to the original spirit of the Logical Investigations and their object-oriented descriptions. On the other hand, the responses consisted in proposing diagnoses of why Husserl turned his phenomenology into a transcendental philosophy; in other words: they aimed at identifying and thereby bringing to the fore the motives that led Husserl to take that pernicious path. In this sense, Ingarden’s On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism has always been regarded as groundbreaking. In opposition to what is argued by Ingarden, the purpose of the present paper is to develop further what Edith Stein contends is the motive that led Husserl to a transcendental and hence idealistic misunderstanding of the Wirklichkeit in her Endliches und ewiges Sein. According to Stein, despite the twofold meaning of “individual essence” (as Wesen and Wirklichkeit), Husserl “takes into consideration only one aspect, namely its essential being, and cuts that connection with reality which attaches to the essence not merely externally but which pertains to it intrinsically. On the basis of this initial cut...it becomes understandable why Husserl had to arrive at an idealistic interpretation of reality”. Our main thesis will be that Husserl’s turn to transcendental idealism could be construed in purely eidetic terms; that is, as deriving from the problem of the inner structure of what both Husserl and Stein refer to as Wesen.

Why Did Ingarden Refuse Husserl’s Transcendental Turn?

Gabriel Marko (Charles University)

Roman Ingarden was one of the closest and most important students of Edmund Husserl from his Göttingen and Freiburg period to refuse Husserl’s transcendental turn. This refusal foreshadowed and latterly shaped the central topic of Ingarden’s philosophy – the so called idealism-realism problem. An important part of Ingarden’s philosophy, including his aesthetics, is devoted to giving this problem a realist solution. In this paper I aim to shed light on the question: Why did Ingarden refuse Husserl’s transcendental turn? It is my claim that this refusal was the result of a gradual process which began in 1912, the year of his first acquaintance with phenomenology, and ended in 1918 when he expressed his first critique of Husserl’s transcendental idealism. The inception of his refusal is rooted in the historical circumstances of his acquaintance with Husserl’s phenomenology. Ingarden was at the same time influenced by Husserl’s phenomenology which was “in the middle of its transcendental turn” as well as by the realist account of phenomenology represented by the Göttingen and the Munich Circle. Ingarden’s early adoption of this realist account, which he followed for the rest of his life, led him to a substantial critical revision of the phenomenological or transcendental reduction from the perspective of external perception. This revision reveals the main differences between Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and his own account. Around 1920, Ingarden considered these differences to be so serious, that he could no longer follow Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.
A Critical Evaluation of Edith Stein’s Critique of Husserl’s Idealism

William Tullius (University of Dallas)

Edith Stein provides her clearest critique of Husserl’s idealism in *Potency and Act*. In this text, Stein proposes a phenomenological approach to ontology which insists upon the absolute being of nature apart from consciousness, while also accepting the fundamental importance and validity of transcendental phenomenological analysis of the constitution of the world through consciousness. Stein’s critique of Husserl ultimately hinges upon what she sees as Husserl’s inability to deal with the apparently irrational fact of the hyletic presupposed by any and all constitutive activities. For Stein, the hyletic data presupposed to a constituting consciousness must be taken as arising out of a connection with a real, transcendentally transcendent world if a constituting subjectivity is to have any genuine significance. I argue that Stein’s critique of Husserl’s transcendental idealism is ultimately inadequate. Moreover, taking Husserl’s genetic analysis of the hyletic into account, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology comes much closer to Stein’s own position than she is perhaps aware. I seek to establish this point, first through an exposition of Stein’s critique as presented in *Potency and Act*, second through a brief investigation of Husserl’s later approach to the hyletic, ultimately uncovering its non-egologically constituted teleology undergirding all transcendental constitution, and finally through an evaluation of the inadequacy of Stein’s argument in light of these developments in Husserl’s thought.

The criticisms of the Utrecht school to the transcendental reduction and the challenges for the phenomenological foundations of normative sciences

Ernesto Guadarrama (UNAM)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the early reception of transcendental phenomenology in the Utrecht School. Langeveld, Beets and Perquin were interested in giving philosophical foundations to education. According to them, the main problem of educational science is the separation of theory and pedagogic practice from their normative principles. In order to solve such difficulties, they took the phenomenological method – which they believed allowed for a theoretical and historical understanding of education from an experiential point of view – as their point of departure. At the same time, they considered transcendental phenomenology to be a solipsistic endeavor that works on an abstract level. Insofar as pedagogical considerations require analyses of the concrete context of social behavior, abstract reflection on a pure ego went in the opposite direction of their practical and normative concerns. After considering the criticisms of transcendental phenomenology put forward by the Utrecht School, I will argue that they rely on a deep misunderstanding of Husserl’s method, and that their main insights lay the groundwork for a transcendental-phenomenological foundation for pedagogy.
Philosophy as Rigorous Science? Scheler contra Husserl.

Bob Sandmeyer (University of Kentucky)

In his 1917 essay "The Essence of Philosophy and the Moral Conditions of Philosophical Knowledge," Scheler criticizes Husserl’s conception of philosophy as rigorous science. There are sciences, Scheler argues, but science as such does not exist. Essentially, philosophy constitutes itself autonomously and under a procedure fundamentally distinct from any of the sciences. Scheler argues that philosophy as a term should be restricted to the evident knowledge of essences whereas the term science can and should refer to the positive formal sciences of ideal objects and the inductive empirical sciences. This seemingly minor point should not obfuscate the central argument in Scheler’s essay, which expresses a position in substantive discord with Husserl’s understanding of the nature of philosophy. According to Scheler, the idea of philosophy can only be fixed by examining the concrete person of the philosopher herself. Husserl explicitly rejects this view, arguing instead that philosophy is a regulative idea guiding a community of researchers over time. For Scheler, however, philosophy is unlike any other cognitive discipline in that it and it alone requires a spiritual technique by which the human engages her whole being in participation with the primordial essence of all things. In my presentation I will analyze this disagreement between Max Scheler and Edmund Husserl as to the nature of philosophy. The main focus will be Scheler’s critique of the Husserlian conception of the phenomenological reduction. I will argue that this disagreement regarding the nature of the reduction is fundamental to the conception of phenomenology as a presuppositionless or autonomous activity.

Reinach, Natorp, and the Exchange between Göttingen Phenomenology and Marburg Neokantianism

Garrett Bredeson (University of Colorado at Boulder)

In the years leading up to the war, Reinach spent as much philosophical capital as anyone in the phenomenological movement in combating the Kantian and Neo-Kantian menace. He lectured extensively on Kant, immersing himself in the secondary literature for his 1910/11 course on the first Critique, which would in turn give rise to two 1911 articles on Kant. Then, in 1914, Reinach undertook his “missionary” trip to Marburg, where he delivered his lecture “Concerning Phenomenology,” and in April of that same year he published an extended review essay of Natorp’s Allgemeine Psychologie. In this paper I will try to contextualize Reinach’s Marburg lecture by considering the stakes of his engagement with the Kantian tradition. Many of the early phenomenologists were hesitant to engage the Kantians in this way; after all, their hope was to get directly to die Sache selbst, not to become entangled in debates about philosophical methodology which were not clearly grounded. In this context, Reinach’s decision to cast phenomenology in a methodological light in his Marburg lecture is particularly interesting. By re-characterizing the question of philosophical method in an uncompromisingly austere way (more austerely than Husserl himself had done in the Ideas), he hoped to subtly short-circuit the kinds of objections Natorp had been raising against Husserl since 1901.
Nikolai Lossky’s Realist Phenomenology

Frederic Tremblay (Institut Jean Nicod)

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Nikolay Lossky was one of the main flag-bearers of the Russian realist reaction against Kantianism and German idealism. He characterizes his own metaphysical position as an “ideal-realism.” By ‘ideal’ he means the Platonic objective realm of ideal being. Lossky’s ontology is thus a double realism: a realism about the Platonic realm of intelligible forms as well as about the external world (i.e., the sensible realm). On this view, truth is about something ontologically independent — a view averse to logical psychologism and relativism. So, when the Logische Untersuchungen appeared, Lossky found in Husserl an ally in his fight against the then prevalent subjectivist approaches. Lossky later took an active interest in Husserl’s phenomenology, essentially because it allowed him, he said, to start without any assumptions. However, he thought of phenomenology as a method of access to being. So, when Husserlian phenomenology took the transcendental idealist turn, Lossky became critical of Husserl. He considered that the latter did not deliver the “return to the things themselves” that he announced and rather performed a “return to the subject.” As a method, phenomenology had to be used, but, as a transcendental idealism, it had to be overcome. Relying primarily on Lossky’s 1909 review of the Russian translation of the first volume of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen and on his “Husserl’s Transcendental-Phenomenological Idealism” (Трансцендентально-феноменологической идеализма Гуссерля) (1939), I present Lossky’s reception of Husserl and Husserlian phenomenology and his criticism thereof.

Methodological Problems of Transcendental Phenomenology: A Neglected Interlocutor

Caterina Del Sordo (University of Florence)

The present paper is divided into two parts, a destruens one and a construens one. My aim is to strengthen the historical thesis, already supported by some scholars, that Carnap was influenced by Husserl’s lectures in Freiburg during the years 1919 to 1921. During this period Carnap was surely working at his doctoral dissertation, Der Raum, and maybe he was already thinking about the content of his Die Quasizerlegung, an important unpublished manuscript dated 1923. The pars destruens of my paper highlights the problems resulting from the mixture of static and genetic method in transcendental phenomenology. Three case-studies will be analyzed: the constitution of material objects (Ideas II), the solipsistic experiments (Ideas II) and the skepticism of retention (Husserliana X). The pars construens attempts to solve these problems by appealing to the young Carnap’s quasi-analytical method. It will be argued that, from a theoretical point of view, quasi-analysis may be able to reunite static and genetic method, arising a new path for a foundational theory of transcendental phenomenology.
On States of Affairs, Judgments and the Great Phenomenological Schism: What the Debates Between Husserl, Daubert & Reinach Reveal

Kimberly Baltzer-Jaray (King’s University College)

Modern discussions of ‘states of affairs’ as a technical philosophical term begin with the works of Hermann Lotze. For Lotze, states of affairs were the special objects of judgments. They serve as targets of judgments, where truth is obtained through the intellects conformity with reality. Discussions of states of affairs and judgments held a dominant position in the philosophical works of Franz Brentano’s students, largely because they read the works of Lotze alongside the empirical, descriptive psychology of their teacher. For the Brentano School, states of affairs and judgments reside at the intersection where the conscious mind meets the external world, and so they speak to the very heart of the boundary of human knowledge about reality, as well as the mind’s structures and capacities. The work of Brentano’s students on states of affairs and judgments, particularly Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, inspired the Munich phenomenologists to ‘invade’ Göttingen. However, two of the leaders of this invasion, Johannes Daubert and Adolf Reinach, were also critical of Husserl: they had misgivings about §§ 69-70 of the Sixth Investigation, specifically with the distinctions Husserl had drawn between statements expressing judgment, wishing, questioning, and commanding, and how these different types of grammatical constructions come to have meaning. In this paper I will discuss the debate that arose between Husserl, Reinach and Daubert on states of affairs and the nature of judgment in 1905, and how it frames and explains much of the schism in the phenomenological movement.

Primacy of intuition in phenomenology: critical realism or transcendental idealism?

Dalius Jonkus (Vytautas Magnus University)

This paper analyzes the phenomenological conception of intuition and its transformation in the philosophy of Vasily Sesemann (1884 -1963). A discussion about intuition is a discussion about the possibility of direct experience. Husserl emphasizes that intuition is the beginning and the end of phenomenology. Cognition has to start from intuition because it is the source of all logical knowledge. Each intuition must be repeated, because without repetition scientific tradition is impossible. Most importantly intuition expresses this openness of the consciousness, when acts of the consciousness are correlated with intentional objects. Sesemann emphasizes the role of the body in cognition. He stresses that the practical knowledge of the surrounding world is related to the body’s position and movement. Practical intuition is possible only as correlation of objects and actions. Sesemann is close to the Heideggerian conception of interpretive understanding, though this is not to say that it is completely distanced from the Husserlian conception of intuition. Interpreters of Sesemann’s philosophy relate it to the work of the Neo-Kantians, but in my opinion Sesemann’s conception of intuition is clearly more associated with the phenomenological tradition. Sesemann criticizes the Neo-Kantians on the basis of the phenomenological concept of open consciousness. Open consciousness means that although familiar things are not immanent to the mind and exist independent from it, you can address them only by depending on the direct giviness of these things, otherwise called intuition. My paper argues that Sesemann’s unique approach allows us to understand that phenomenology also can be interpreted as a critical realism.
Husserl’s Transcendental Turn as an Expression of Brentano’s Scholasticism

Charlene Elsby (Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne)

It appears as a well-known fact that Husserl fell victim to the shameful sort of idealism unheard of since Berkeley. According to Ingarden in On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, only Husserl’s emphasis of the transcendence of the material object distinguishes his idealism from that of the Bishop’s. In this paper, I posit that Husserl’s transcendental turn is not really a turn, and not really idealism. Rather, it is a logical inference of his taking seriously the distinction between mental and physical phenomena as presented in Brentano’s Scholastic-inspired statement of the intentionality of consciousness in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Husserl cites this definition in Cartesian Meditations §40 “Transition to the question of transcendental idealism”). Brentano’s original statement of the distinction between mental and physical phenomena points toward a distinction between the modes of being of the essence of a thing. The numerical identity between the multiple modes of being of an essence is, I argue, what Husserl is thinking when he writes that the universe and our knowledge of it “belong together essentially; and as belonging together essentially, they are also concretely one.” It is a retention of Brentano’s conception of the active intellect’s abstracting the object of consciousness from its material counterpart and thereby giving the intentional object the property of intentional inexistence.

The Great Schism in Phenomenology and the understanding of the epoché of Ideas I

Javier San Martin (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia)

The main problem with Husserl’s phenomenology as presented in Ideas I was that in the second section of the book, Husserl presents his phenomenology as a form of transcendental Idealism – a point that he confesses many times from then on into the 30s. This caused a split in the phenomenological movement. The problem is whether those involved really understood what Husserl had proposed. The difficulty of understanding phenomenology as transcendental idealism was so great that even Husserl had to adapt his text to rid it of misunderstandings. In this paper I argue that the great schism occurred because the implicit architecture supposed in Ideas is not made explicit in the “fundamental phenomenological meditation,” i.e., the section of Ideas in which the method of the epoché and reduction are exposed. To prove my thesis I will discuss the two indications of the architecture of phenomenology that are exposed explicitly in the 20s, the first referring to the relationship of phenomenology to psychology, and the second, the need for intersubjectivity to overcome the field of psychology. To test the first I shall take into consideration the meaning of the two slight changes that Husserl introduced in § 34 of Ideas. To test the second I will discuss a later text - Beilage XXX (1924), in Erste Philosophie II.
The Question of Attention in the First Phenomenological Schism

Andrea Scanziani (University of Milan)

Since the beginning of the development of phenomenology, attention has been one of the most investigated phenomena of consciousness. Drawing from Hume’s investigations on perception to more psychological approaches, discussions of attention come to arise contemporaneously in the Husserl’s early works and those of the Munich phenomenologists. The exchange of ideas and mutual influence between Husserl and Munich phenomenologist after the publication of the *Logical Investigations* has been a topic of some discussion in some of the secondary literature, but questions about the core of the Husserlian approach and the “Munich way” to attention as a psycho-phenomenological task have only been outlined. If within the Husserlian analysis, attention is strictly related to the description of the nature of intentional acts and is linked to the methodological move of reduction, then it is important to evaluate the importance and effects that the encounter with the tradition of Theodor Lipps and the Munich Circle had on Husserl’s analysis of attention. For example, the notion of *Lichtkegel* plays a fundamental role in both Pfänder’s development of the analysis of perception and consciousness of objects, as well as in his way of questioning the subject. This paper aims to investigate the possible influence of the concept of attention developed by the authors of the Munich Circle on Husserl.

The Letters of Edith Stein to Roman Ingarden as a source for understanding the Realism-Idealism Polemic in the Phenomenological Movement

Eduardo González Di Pierro (Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo)

The correspondence of Edith Stein provides interesting source material for understanding both her thinking as part of the genesis of the phenomenological movement from its early stages, and the socio-political and cultural context surrounding Husserl’s “transcendental turn.” I argue that, due to the lack of a broad and comprehensive understanding of his entire project, many of Husserl’s first disciples in the Göttingen Circle were incorrect in attacking Husserl’s mature position. I will focus my discussion on the letters which Stein wrote to Roman Ingarden between 1917 and 1938. These are particularly revealing with respect to two key issues: 1) whether Husserl’s phenomenology is any kind of idealism at all, much less a "classic" Fichtean-Kantian style idealism, and 2) that while Stein initially adhered to the criticisms of her classmates, she was gradually moving away from the realist position and toward Husserl’s transcendental idealism. The views expressed by Stein throughout her correspondence with Ingarden is helpful for understanding the finer nuances of the philosophical controversy concerning realism-idealism which fuelled many discussions among the early phenomenologists and which remain a topic of debate in contemporary scholarship.